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JUS AD BELLUM IN THE AGE OF WMED PROLIFERATION
DANIEL

H. JOYNER*

This Article will discuss the normative question of what should
be the character of the rules and institutions of international law
covering international uses of force, in the age of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies. It will posit
that international use of force law is currently in a state of crisis,
precipitated by the proliferation of WMD technologies and the
revised set of national security calculations, which determine when
and why states choose to use force internationally, that have been
thrust upon states as a result. It will review a number of options
which have been proposed for changing the substance of international laws and institutions which currently regulate this area, in
order to make them responsive to this change in international
security realities, and more effective and useful to states. However
it will conclude that none of these proposals truly grasps the nettle
of the problems facing states in the post-proliferated age, and the
challenge of designing and maintaining effective and supportable
rules and institutions in this area. It will argue that more fundamental changes to the character of these rules and institutions are
necessary if they are to fulfill a needed role in providing standards
for international behavior in this most vital area of international
relations. Using both international legal theory and international
relations theory, it will argue specifically that international law regulating uses of force should be deformalized, and maintained not
as legally binding rules, but as politically persuasive norms. This
change in the character of rules in this area, it will be argued,
would help to preserve the integrity of the rest of the formal
corpus of international law, while accomplishing virtually the same
results in influencing state behavior and in normativizing international relations in this area, as do the current formal rules of the
jus ad bellum.
* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. M.A. 2003, University
of Georgia; J.D. 2001, Duke University; B.A. 1998 Brigham Young University. The author is
grateful for the support of St. Antony's College, Oxford University, where this Article was
substantially researched, and to Michael Byers, Andrew Hurrell, Adam Roberts, Nico
Krisch, and Rosemary Foot for helpful review and insights.
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A word on the intent of this Article before proceeding. The
analysis and proposals in this Article are the result of long deliberation regarding the crisis moment which the jus ad bellum currently
faces largely as a result of WMD proliferation. The resulting analysis and proposals will no doubt be considered by some to be somewhat revolutionary, and perhaps even radical. While they are
indeed intended to be new and challenging, it will be argued that
they are in fact based upon sound theoretical underpinnings, to be
found in both international legal theory and international relations theory. It will further be argued that they are a rational product of a realistic assessment of the current crisis and its
consequences for international legal regulation in this area.
It cannot be overemphasized that the proposals contained
herein are not intended to undermine international law. Quite
the contrary, they are specifically intended to bring the character
of international law in the area of international uses of force into
harmony with the reality of the modern security landscape which
states face, and thus ultimately to strengthen the formal corpus of
international law generally. With regard specifically to the jus ad
bellum, the deformalization thesis advanced herein should be
understood not simply as a normative regression, but rather as a
tactical normative retreat made necessary by fundamental changes
in circumstance. This normative direction could, and should, be
reversed in the future when the infrastructure of the international
legal system is better able to provide effective regulation in this
most sensitive and important area of international relations.
I.

PROLIFERATION, PREEMPTION AND USE OF FORCE LAW

A.

Crisis? What Crisis?

The first issue for consideration in this analysis is whether in fact
there is currently a crisis in international use of force law, brought
about by WMD proliferation and changed security realities for
states. Some would doubtless reject this as an alarmist position and
maintain that while the instruments and means of international
violence have certainly changed since the United Nations Charter
(U.N. Charter or Charter), the primary source of governing international law in this area, was founded in 1945, the considerations
that states must undertake when deciding to use force internationally have not fundamentally changed since that time, and therefore
no urgent change to existing law is required. This conclusion
indeed was apparently reached by the United Nations Secretary-
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General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in
its 2004 report entitled "A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility."' In its report, the High-Level Panel found that
there was no need either for re-writing or re-interpreting Article 51
of the U.N. Charter on self-defense, or for fundamentally changing
the role of the U.N. Security Council (Security Council or Council)
as the sole authorizer of international uses of force other than
those justified by reference to Article 51, including those purposed
in addressing WMD threats. To quote from the report, "[t] he
short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be
put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it
2
chooses to."

However, this static approach seems at odds with the stated opinion of the Secretary-General himself, who in September of 2003
expressed this crisis to the U.N. General Assembly as follows:
All of us know there are new threats that must be faced-or,
perhaps, old threats in new and dangerous combinations: new
forms of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
Where we disagree, it seems, is on how to respond to these
threats.. .. Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if
attacked, retain the inherent right of self-defence. But until
now it has been understood that when States go beyond that
and decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations.
Now, some say this understanding is no longer tenable, since an
"armed attack" with weapons of mass destruction could be
launched at any time, without warning, or by a clandestine
group. Rather than wait for that to happen, they argue, States
have the right and obligation to use force pre-emptively, even
on the territory of other States, and even while weapons systems
that might be used to attack them are still being developed.
According to this argument, States are not obliged to wait until
there is agreement in the Security Council. Instead, they reserve
the right to act unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalitions.
1. The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the
192, 198, delivered to the General AssemHigh-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change,
bly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/
report.pdf [hereinafter A More Secure World]; see also Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and
ContemporarySecurity Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 415, 419-20 (2007)
(arguing that the threats of weapons of mass destruction and modern terrorism can be
addressed utilizing the existing international framework of the U.N. Security Council).
2. A More Secure World, supra note 1, 190.
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This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles
on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have
rested for the last fifty-eight years.
We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no
less decisive
than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was
3
founded.
As indicated in these remarks, the fundamental challenge to
U.N. Charter law which the Secretary-General perceived has been
most saliently presented in the context of debates regarding the
legality of anticipatory, or preemptive self-defense in situations
where states feel that they are threatened by a target state or nonstate actor's development, possession or threat of use of WMD.
Former Secretary-General Annan's remarks above were of course
made during the 2003 diplomatic standoff over whether, and on
what legal justification, to use force against Iraq in order to forcibly
disarm it of its suspected WMD stockpiles. However, debates
regarding the use of preemptive force to prevent states and nonstate actors "of concern" from developing and using WMD have
not been limited to the case of Iraq. Indeed, an even more recent
example of such a preemptive use of force was presented by Israel's
September 6, 2007 unilateral attack upon a site in Syria, which was
later claimed to be a nuclear reactor site, constructed with the help
4
of North Korea.
B.

Counterproliferation

The post-September 11 international security climate has seen a
general shifting in the policy positions of the United States and a
number of other relatively powerful states, toward an increased
emphasis on proactive and often unilateral or small-coalition-based
strategies of "counterproliferation," and away from more multilateral and diplomacy-based efforts of "non-proliferation." While
non-proliferation efforts have classically depended upon diplomacy and upon individual state implementation of treaty law and
of rules agreed in other normative regimes of both a formal and
informal character, counterproliferation efforts are generally
designed to forcefully preclude specific actors from obtaining
WMD-related materials and technologies or to degrade and destroy
3. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. rntg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 25,
2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.
4. See Robin Wright, N. Koreans Taped At Syrian Reactor; Video Played a Role in Israeli
Raid, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2008, at Al.; David E. Sanger, Video Links North Koreans to Syria
Reactor, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at A14.
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an actor's existing WMD capability. Such counterproliferation
efforts include interdiction of suspected transfers of sensitive items,
and preemptive acts of force against either actual or potential pos5
sessors of WMD.
While a shift toward counterproliferation policies can be seen in
the statements of officials of a number of states, notably including
Russia, Japan, India, Israel, Australia and the United Kingdom, it
has been most formally adopted by the United States in its stated
foreign and security policy. 6 In both the September 2002 National
Security Strategy document and the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction document, U.S.
policymakers signaled a significant shift in WMD-related policies
toward counterproliferation principles. As stated in the latter
document:
We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in
preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile
states and terrorists....

Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces
and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate
civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against
WMD-armed adversaries, including
in appropriate cases
through preemptive measures. 7
The National Security Strategy document discussed the concept
of preemption further thus:
5. SeeJason D. Ellis, The Best Defense: Counterproliferationand U.S. NationalSecurity, 26:2
WASH. Q., 115, 115-17 (Spring 2003); Daniel H. Joyner, The ProliferationSecurity Initiative:
Nonproliferation, Counteproliferation, and International Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 507, 520
(2005); Robert S. Litwak, The New Calculus of Pre-emption, 44:4 SURVIVAL 53, 55 (Winter
2002).
6. See Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities:
Possible Consequences, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, Sept. 9, 2004, http://cns.
miis.edu/stories/040812.htm; India Mulls 'Pre-Emptive'PakistanStrike, Cites U.S. Iraq War Precedent, AGENT FRANCE PRESS, Apr. 11, 2003, available at http://www.fromthewilderness.
com/free/ww3/041403_india.html; Israel's Plans for Iran Strikes, JANE'S, July 16, 2004,
http://www.janes.com/security/internationalsecurity/news/jid/id04O7l6_1_n. shtml;
Mari Yamaguchi, Japan MullingAction over N. Korea Missiles, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2006/07/ 1O/ap/world/mainD8IPODUOO.shtml; Kim
Murphy, Russia Asserts Military Options, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at A6; Tony Blair, Prime
Minister, Speech on the Threat of Global Terrorism (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://
www.numberlo.gov/uk/Page5461; Dan Murphy, Terror-preemption talk roils Asia, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 5, 2002, at 6, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/
analysis/2002/ 1205preemption.html.
7. White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 2-3
(2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf.
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The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inactionand the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action
to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time
and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such
hostile attacks by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively ....

[I]n an age where the enemies of

civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive
technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.8
The place of the doctrine of preemption in U.S. counterproliferation policy was confirmed in the 2006 National Security Strategy
document, which specifically sought to justify the doctrine on the
basis of a right to preemptive self-defense in international law. The
document states as follows:
Meeting WMD proliferation challenges also requires effective
international action ....

Taking action need not involve mili-

tary force.... If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self-defense, we do not rule .out the use of force before
attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack. 9

One of the recent policy manifestations of this doctrinal shift
toward preemptive action to deal with WMD threats is to be found
in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a program involving
some fifty states at various levels of cooperation in logistic, law
enforcement, and military efforts aimed at interdicting WMDrelated items and technologies in transit, most often over the sea
lanes. 10 The PSI is essentially a set of principles mandating proactive efforts to arrest proliferation in WMD-related materials at its
most vulnerable point: during shipment and before such materials
can be integrated into WMD development programs. PSI interdictions are ongoing, and tend to involve the stopping and searching
of vessels suspected of carrying WMD related technologies from
origins or to destinations of concern to PSI participants, and the
confiscation of any such materials found. The PSI has been
defended by its proponents, chief among whom is John Bolton, the

8.
(2002),
9.
(2006),
10.

White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15
available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America 22-23
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2OO6.pdf.
See generally Joyner, supra note 5; Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 Am. J. INT'L L. 526 (2004).
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former U.S. Under Secretary of State, as being justified by reference to principles of self-defense in international law."
Concerns regarding state use of preemptive force against other
states and non-state actors, however, are not limited to the actions
of the West or to developed states. There are real concerns that
recent rhetoric by major powers legitimizing counterproliferationoriented preemption will strengthen the resolve of a number of
other states to apply the doctrine to their own regional conflicts.
Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha was quoted in 2003 as stating that India had "a much better case to go for preemptive action
against Pakistan than the United States has in Iraq," referencing
the threat posed to India by Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. 12 Israel has
also expressed alarm over recent statements by Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that Israel should be "wiped off the map,"
leading to concern that Israel will act preemptively against Iran to
degrade its capacity to produce nuclear weapons, following a pattern of preemptive uses of force, which Israel followed in 1967
3
against Egypt, in 1981 against Iraq, and in 2007 against Syria.'
Indeed, the degree to which the idea of dealing with WMD
proliferation concerns by recourse to preemptive attacks has
become a familiar and decreasingly broad conceptual leap generally in international society, was recently amply illustrated by the
speed at which media outlets from around the world turned from
questioning whether Iran's file would be referred by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security Council, to a race to
confirm which states had not yet taken the idea of military force to
14
deal with Iran "off the table."
C.

International Use of Force Law

However, as former Secretary-General Annan's comments above
express, this trend in policy emphasis upon preemptive, forceful
counterproliferation actions does not sit easily with existing international use of force law, with the U.N. Charter as its cornerstone.
According to the system for use of force regulation established in
11.

See Greg Sheridan, US 'Free' to Tackle N Korea, THE AUSTRALIAN (NEW SOUTH WALES

METRO EDITION), July 9, 2003, at 1.
12. India Mulls 'Pre-Emptive' PakistanStrike, supra note 6, at 1.

13. See Israel's Plansfor Iran Strikes, JANE'S, July 16, 2004, http://www.janes.com/security/international-security/news/id/id040716_-n.shtml; Wright, supra note 4, at Al;
Sanger, supra note 4, at A14; Salama and Ruster, supra note 6.
14. See Ashton Carter & William Perry, The Casefor a Preemptive Strike on North Korea's
Missiles, TIME, July 8, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1211527,00.
html.
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the Charter, which for its parties comprises binding international
law superseding all other treaty commitments, there are only two
legal justifications for an international use of force which violates
the territorial integrity of another state. 15 The first is a recognition
of the "inherent right to self-defense" under Article 51 of the Charter, and the second is authorization of force by the U.N. Security
Council under a resolution passed using the authority granted to
the Council in Chapter VII of the Charter. Since the Security
Council has not been used successfully as a forum in which anticipatory, or preemptive, uses of force against WMD threats have
been authorized (a subject to which consideration will return later
in this Article), the only arguable legal basis for such actions has
been a reliance upon the self-defense provisions of Article 51.16
These provisions allow for temporary, unilateral recourse to
force "if an armed attack occurs" against a member of the United
Nations. Although the plain meaning of these terms would seem
to restrict such a use of force in self-defense to a case in which an
armed attack by another state or non-state actor has taken place or
at least has commenced,17 the recognition that Article 51 functions
15. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 265, 268
(1963) (explaining that both the inherent right to self-defence and the authorization of
force by the U.N. Security Council under a resolution passed using the authority granted
the Council in Chapter VII of the Charter); ANTHONY R. AREND & ROBERTJ. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 31 (1993) (detailing four explicit justifications for the use of force, including "force used in self-defence"
and "force authorized by the United Nations Security Council"); THOMAS FRANCK,
RECOURSE TO FORCE 2-3 (Cambridge University Press) (2002) (explaining the "collective

use of force at the behest of the Security Council" and the actions of a state taken "in selfdefense against any military aggression").
16. DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION ch. 7 (2009).

17. See Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal
Change, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 171, 172 (2003) ("[A]ccording to traditional means of treaty interpretation, the words 'if an armed attack occurs[,]' [as found in Article 51,] preclude any
right to preemptive action."); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 38

(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2002) ("Therefore Art. 51 has to be interpreted narrowly as
containing a prohibition of anticipatory self-defence. Self-defence is thus permissible only
after the armed attack has already been launched."); BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 273 (
"[W] here the Charter has a specific provision relating to a particular legal category, to
assert that this does not restrict the wider ambit of the customary law relating to that category or problem is to go beyond the bounds of logic. Why have treaty provisions at all?...
It is submitted that a restrictive interpretation of the provisions of the Charter relating to
the use of force would be more justifiable and that even as a matter of 'plain' interpretation the permission in Article 51 is exceptional in the context of the Charter and exclusive
of any customary right of self-defence."); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE (3rd ed. 2001); AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF
THE LEGAL CONCEPT 125 (1979). See generally Richard A. Falk, VWat Futurefor the UN Charter
System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 590 (2003). Further, The Vienna Convention
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simply to recognize an already existing "inherent right" of states
has led many commentators to the conclusion that this language in
Article 51 worked a retention of the rights of self-defense obtaining
18
under pre-Charter customary law for U.N. Charter signatories.
In classical customary international law, the right of a state to use
force in a preemptive manner, to anticipate an attack which had
not yet commenced but which was imminently threatened, enjoyed
broad support among states and was a firmly established legal
right. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the right of anticipatory self-defense as a matter of customary international law was
on the Law of Treaties specifies that the plain (ordinary) meaning of a treaty provision, in
context and in the light of its object and purpose, is to be given preeminence in interpretation. Art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332. Supplementary means of interpretation,
including preparatory work of the treaty, can only be employed when the foregoing analysis of ordinary meaning leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or "leads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Id. art. 32.
18. See MvREs S. McDoUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND PUBLIC ORDER 235 (1994) ("It is of common record in
the preparatory work on the Charter that Article 51 was not drafted for the purpose of
deliberately narrowing the customary-law permission of self-defense against a current or
imminent unlawful attack by raising the required degree of necessity .... [I]t was made
quite clear . . . that the traditional permission of self-defense was not intended to be
abridged and attenuated but, on the contrary, to be reserved and maintained."); D.W.
BowETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 185 (1958) ( "It is ... fallacious to assume
that members have only those rights which the Charter accords to them; on the contrary
they have those rights which general international law accords to them except in so far as
they have surrendered them under the Charter .... [T] he view of Committee I at San
Francisco was that this prohibition [Article 2(4)] left the right of self-defense
unimpaired."). Although addressing a different substantive question, the International
Court of Justice, in a 1986 decision, concluded that:
Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a 'natural'
or 'inherent' right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than
of a customary nature ..... Moreover the Charter, having itself recognized the
existence of this right, does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain any specific rule whereby self-defence
would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law.
Moreover, a definition of the 'armed attack' which, if found to exist, authorizes
the exercise of the 'inherent right' of self-defence, is not provided in the Charter,
and is not part of treaty law. It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a
provision which 'subsumes and supervenes" customary international law. It
rather demonstrates that in the field in question, .. . customary international law
continues to exist alongside treaty law.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27). The ICJ
opinion does not, however, establish a rule for circumstances in which there is clear conflict between custom and treaty law. Id. (illustrating how the scope of the U.N. Charter is
not all-inclusive with respect to use of force). In such a situation it could still be argued
that the treaty constitutes a special and separate regime and that for treaty signatories a
conflict between treaty law and customary law must be resolved with the treaty rule being
given priority.
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circumscribed by several substantive limiting principles: imminence, necessity, and proportionality.1 9
The correspondence between U.S. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster and British officials during the famous Carolineincident is
widely understood as offering a correct iteration of customary
international law pertaining at the time:
Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (April 24, 1841)
It will be for... [Her Majesty's] government to show a necessity
of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to
show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing
the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or
excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense,
°
must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.2
Ian Brownlie has suggested that state practice between 1841 and
1945 served to limit even further the flexibility of the principle of
anticipatory self-defense, leaving it in a tenuous state of existence
at the time of the drafting of the U.N. Charter. 21 This position
would seem to be supported through even more recent events,
such as the 1981 preemptive attack by Israel against a suspected
Iraqi nuclear weapons site at Osirak. Resolution 487 of the U.N.
Security Council, which was adopted unanimously, denounced the
incident as a "clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations"
notwithstanding Israel's believable (and later validated) claim
regarding Iraq's clandestine WMD program and its connection to
the site. 2 2 As Christine Gray has observed:
19. See BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 257-64 (elaborating upon the principles of necessity and proportionality in customary international law); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1024-25 (5th ed. 2003); Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.Cj. at 362 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel) (arguing that the Caroline criteria are exclusively applicable to cases of anticipatory self-defense).
20. THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 43 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker et

al. eds., 1983). The Carolinewas a U.S. registered steamer hired to ferry provisions across
the Niagara river to supply Canadian rebels taking part in the insurrection against British
colonial rule of Canada in 1837. On December 29, several boatloads of British soldiers
came across the river onto the U.S. side and set fire to the Caroline, dragged her into the
river current, and sent her blazing over Niagara Falls, killing one man in the process. The
ensuing diplomatic correspondence between U.S. and U.K. officials has come to be
regarded as a reliable statement of contemporary customary international law on self
defense.
21.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 701-02 (6th ed. 2003).

22. See Anthony D'Amato, Israel'sAir Strike upon the IraqiNuclear Reactor, 77 AM.J. INT'L
L. 584, 585-86 (1983); Louis Rene Beres and Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, "Sony" Seems to be the
Hardest Word, THE JERUSALEM POST, Jun. 9, 2003, at 08B. On September 6, 2007, Israeli
warplanes attacked and destroyed a site in Syria which was later claimed to be a nuclear

reactor site, constructed with the help of North Korea. See Wright, supra note 4, at Al;
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[T]he actual invocation of the right to anticipatory self-defence
in practice is rare. States clearly prefer to rely on self-defence in
response to an armed attack if they possibly can. In practice
they prefer to take a wide view of armed attack rather than
openly claim anticipatory self-defence. It is only when no conceivable case can be made that there has been an armed attack
that they resort to anticipatory self-defence. This reluctance
expressly to invoke anticipatory self-defence is in itself a clear
indication of the doubtful status of this justification for the use
of force. States take care to try to secure the widest possible
support; they do not invoke a doctrine that they know will be
unacceptable to the vast majority of states. Certain writers, however, ignore this choice by states and argue that if states in fact
act in anticipation of an armed attack this should count as anticipatory self-defence in state practice. This is another example of
certain writers going beyond what states themselves say in justification of their action in order to argue for a wide right of self23
defence.
A few of these commentators seem prepared to treat any US
action as a precedent creating new legal justification for the use
of force. Thus they use US actions as shifting the Charter paradigm and extending the right of self-defence. The lack of effective action against the USA as a sanction confirms them in this
view. But the vast majority of other states remained firmly
attached to a narrow conception of self-defence ... 24
The clear trend in state practice before 9/11 was to try to bring
the action within Article 51 and to claim the existence of an
armed attack rather than to argue expressly for a wider right
25
under customary international law.

Sanger, supra note 4, at A14. Information about the attack and the site has been difficult
for the general public to discern, as both Israel and Syria have been less than forthcoming
about the incident. Some details came to public light in April of 2008, when U.S. intelligence services gave a briefing to the U.S. Congress on the event. Due to the paucity of
confirmed facts regarding the site and the attack, international opinion has at the time of
this writing been difficult to gauge. Some have argued that the absence of formal censure
by states has amounted to a tacit acquiescence to the strike. However, the lack of certainty
regarding the details of the site and the attack likely make such assessments premature.
Leonard S. Spector and Auner Cohen, Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Reactor: Implicationsfor the
Nonproliferation Regime, 38 ARMNs CONTROL TODAY 15 (2008).
23. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 130 (2d ed. 2004)
24. Id. at 134.
25. Id. at 133; see also Christine Gray, The Principle of Non-Use of Force, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 33 (Colin Warbrick & Vaughan Lowe

eds., 1994) (exploring the role of U.N. resolutions with regard to the use of force in international relations); Christine Gray, The Use andAbuse of the InternationalCourt ofJustice: Cases
Concerning the Use of Force After Nicaragua, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 867 (2003) (discussing the
International Court of Justice's cautious approach to use of force cases). For contrasting
opinions on the subject of state practice in the area of anticipatory self-defense, see gener-
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However, the right to anticipatory self-defense, as limited by
imminence, necessity, and proportionality, is considered by many
international lawyers to remain a valid doctrine in customary international law, and to be a right upon which even U.N. Charter
26
members may rely.
The problem in the context of counterproliferation-oriented
preemptive uses of force, however, is that this policy, as expressed
by the United States and other states, and as carried out in practice
in some recent cases, calls for uses of force against states and nonstate actors within other states who are simply developing or are in
possession of WMD, without the existence of an immediate threat
that such weapons will be used against the state pursuing the policy
of preemption. Imminence, again, is a key criterion which must be
satisfied in order to justify a self-defensive action by reference to
the customary law right of anticipatory self-defense. Therefore, an
implementation of this policy, in which unilateral international
force is used by a state prior to actual armed attack, against state or
non-state actors that simply possess or are developing WMD, without the existence of a meaningful threat to use such weapons
which satisfies the criteria set out in the Caroline case, does not satisfy the requirements for justification under either the text of Article 51 or the customary right of anticipatory self-defense which it
arguably incorporates, and therefore constitutes a violation of U.N.
Charter Article 2(4).27
Notwithstanding this legal incongruity, the policy of counterproliferation-oriented preemption continues to be seen by a number of states as a necessary, final option to be used against WMD
threats when no other tools appear to be working. 28 The idea that
states must, per the text of Article 51 or the restrictive interpretation of anticipatory self-defense prescribed by customary law, wait
for a WMD attack to have already taken place against them, or at
least for indisputable evidence of a threat of use of WMD against
them which leaves them "no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation" before they are allowed to act in self-defense, is to the
ally AREND & BECK, supra note 15; A. Mark Weisburd, USE OF FORCE (1997) (examining
third-state reactions to various alleged uses of force in self-defense).
26. See ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, CHATHAM HOUSE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES IN SELF-DEFENCE 4 (2005), available at http://www.chatham
house.org.uk/research/international-law/current-projects/.
27. SeeJoYNER, supra note 16.
28. In addition to statements supporting preemptive use of force made by U.S. officials, officials from Russia, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, India, and Israel have
made relevant statements. See sources cited supra note 6.
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minds of many policymakers a wholly unrealistic notion, and
unworkable in practice.
This then exposes the heart of the problem facing modern states
in their desires both to vigorously pursue policies seen as necessary
to their national security, and at the same time to support and
comply with international law, and comprises the cause of the current crisis in international use of force law. The U.N. Charter, now
nearly sixty years old, is in the minds of many policymakers in states
that are shifting their emphasis toward counterproliferation, an
anachronism; a set of norms which, if accurately reflective of the
principled universe which states inhabited within the context of
the evolution of military technology and geopolitics in 1945, is currently unfit for the task of providing a set of workable and supportable principles for governing this most sensitive area of
international relations.
These policymakers point not only to the proliferation of WMD
technologies themselves, which have worked an evolution in the
instruments of violence and the amount of damage that can be
done in a single "armed attack," but also to the emergence of
sophisticated non-state actors whom, it is feared, will be able to use
these weapons, changing the rules on where states must look to
predict and manage threats, as well as the effectiveness of classical
doctrines such as deterrence and containment for managing these
threats. 29 These doctrines, while employed with some success in
inter-state security tensions, seem likely to be largely ineffective
against the fluid assets and operative networks of international
non-state actors, and particularly those driven by extreme ideological motives.3 0 As Daniel Poneman has explained:
Obviously, deterrence depends on having a return address
which one can target and send an opponent a response to that
which has just been received. However, terrorists do not often
leave return addresses. Moreover, deterrence depends on a particular view of human nature. If you read Hobbes's Leviathan,
you understand that, at the least, you need a minimal sense of
29. See George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks in Address to the Nation (Mar. 17,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/200303177.html; see also George W. Bush, U.S. President, Speech at West Point Graduation Ceremony (June 1, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/
20020601-3.html; Tony Blair, Prime Minister, U.K., Remarks on Release of Iraq Dossier
(Sept. 24, 2002), in GUARDIA'N, Sept. 24, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/
sep/24/iraq.speeches (discussing what was thought to be the threat of Iraqi WMD).
30.

See generally
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rence as used against rogue states).
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self-preservation to rely upon if you expect notions of deterrence to obtain. In a terrorist context-in which, if not the leaders, then certainly the cannon fodder they send in to do the
suicide bombings and therefore are not driven by the desire31 for
self-preservation-you can no longer count on deterrence.
While some observers might characterize these views regarding
the threat posed by WMD and the anachronistic character of
existing international use of force law as extreme and reactionary,
or perhaps even paranoid, the fact remains that many policymakers
in couterproliferation-oriented states genuinely believe that it is
necessary for the security of their states that they are able to use
force preemptively against these new threats before they develop
the qualities of demonstrable immediacy necessary to square such
actions with existing use of force law. Moreover, it is clear that a
number of these states will continue to act in pursuance of these
beliefs, and of couterproliferation policies of preemption, regardless of the formal, technical requirements of international law.
This, then, is the heart of the crisis: a significant number of states
now believe that their vital national security interests require them
to act in a manner that is in breach of the laws governing international uses of force laid down in the U.N. Charter. This is not a
temporary policy shift, nor are actions taken in pursuance of
counterproliferation policies isolated or extraordinary events. Policies of counterproliferation-oriented preemptive use of force are a
part of a systematic rethinking within a significant number of states
about the security environment in which states find themselves,
and the policy options those states feel they must maintain in order
to defend themselves against modern threats, and to pursue their
essential interests internationally. 32 This is a revision of thought
that is likely to persist and mature within these states, and it is likely
that, as WMD proliferation inevitably spreads and becomes more
intimately a part of the security concerns of a growing number of
states, those states too will arrive at the conclusion that traditional
31.

Daniel B. Poneman, A New Bargain, in ATOMS FOR PEACE: A FUTURE AFTER FItY
177, 179-180 (Joseph F. Pilat ed., 2007).
32. See M. Elaine Bunn, Force, Preemption, and WMD Proliferation,in COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 156,
156-58 (Nathan Busch & Daniel Joyner eds., 2009) (outlining U.S. strategy changes); Ellis,
supra note 5, at 122, 129, 130, Litwak, supra note 5, at 1, 59, 73;JASON D. ELLIS & GEOFFREY
D. KIEFER, COMBATING PROLIFERATION: STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY POLICY
(2004) (providing a "candid assessment of the inherent intelligence challenges, policy
trade-offs, and operational considerations central to America's long-standing quest to prevent and ultimately manage WMD proliferation and to defend against an adversary's use of
such weapons").
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non-proliferation efforts based in multilateralism and diplomacy,
and utilizing strategies such as deterrence and containment, are
not wholly sufficient to deal with these realities. They will likely
conclude, as others have done, that policies of preemptive use of
force against states and non-state actors that threaten them with
WMD, and who will not sufficiently respond to or be managed by
these classic strategies, are a necessary addition to the policy
options at their disposal.
Therefore, at the heart of the current crisis in international use
of force law is a continuing, and likely increasing gap between the
provisions of existing law and the perceptions of a significant number of important states of the realities of the international political
issue area that law is meant to regulate-a classic gap between law
and reality caused by the law simply lagging behind the dynamics
of technological and geo-political change. 33 Such a situation, in
which the law is seen by its subjects to be out of touch with the "on
the ground" realities of the decisions and actions it is intended to
govern, in any area of the law, is simply unsustainable, and as in
any other area of law the result of this gap is decreasing confidence
in the law and its institutions of maintenance, a decreasing perception of the validity of the law, increasing antagonism toward the
law, and resultant non-compliance with the reason-offending
rules. 34 This indeed was one of the fundamental reasons underlying the decision by Western powers to invade Iraq in 2003, and is
the reason that fears abound regarding future acts of force outside
of the U.N. Charter use of force system by counterproliferationoriented states, in places like Iran and North Korea.

33. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,25 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 549-58 (2002); HansJ.
Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and InternationalLaw, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260, 260
(1940); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (2002); Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A
TransitionalMoment, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 629 (2003); Robert F. Turner, OperationIraqi
Freedom: Legal and Policy Considerations,27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 765, 792-93 (2004); Ruth
Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense,
97 Am.J. INT'L L. 576, 583 (2003);John C. Yoo & Will Trachman, Less Than Bargainedfor:
The Use of Force and the Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 379, 381-82
(2005). See generallyAnthony Clark Arend, InternationalLaw and the Preemptive Use of Military
Force, WASH. Q., Spring 2003, at 89 (assessing the lawfulness of the Bush doctrine and its
approach to the evolving threats and capabilities of terrorist adversaries); Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the "Jurisprudes,"97 AM.J. INT'L L. 585 (2003) (arguing that U.S. policy
surrounding the 2003 Iraq invasion illustrates the need for a different approach to use of
force issues in the international community).
34. See Glennon, supra note 33.
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D. DisproportionateSignificance?
Still, it is certainly true that only relatively powerful states would
consider engaging in a counterproliferation-oriented preemptive
use of force. This is of course because only a relatively few states in
the world have the capacity to project power through military force
internationally, with confidence that they will be able to successfully withstand responsive uses of force against them.
Some will no doubt argue as a consequence of this fact, that
there are simply too few states anxiously concerned with this issue,
and willing to act in furtherance of preemptive strike policies, for it
to be cited as the cause of a "crisis" in international use of force
law.
It should be borne in mind, however, that while numerically in
the minority, these powerful actors are a disproportionately important subset of states to consider with regard to the current status
and future character and substance of international use of force
law for a number of interconnected reasons. Firstly, among this
subset are many states who, correctly or not, feel particularly
threatened by the possibility of WMD attacks against them. For
some states this is due to longstanding regional inter-state disputes,
the parties to which have or are in the process of developing WMD
arsenals.3 5 For other states, this is because of aspects of their political or cultural identity, or their international influence and activity,
which they perceive have increased the likelihood of asymmetric
attacks against them by terrorists and other, particularly non-state,
actors using WMD. 36 This fact of perceived particular threat,
together with the above mentioned capacity of such states to act
internationally in pursuance of a broad understanding of their vital
national interests, produces a peculiar and important subset of
states that are both most likely to want to have the legal option to
engage in counterproliferation-oriented preemptive acts of force,
and at the same time most likely to have the power and influence
in international relations to either alter or opt-out of treaties, as
well as to employ the means of creation of customary law, in order
37
to bring about such desired legal changes.
In addition to their disproportionate motivation for and influence in changing relevant sources of law, these powerful actors are
35. See IndiaMulls 'Pre-Emptive'PakistanStrike, supra note 6; Israel'sPlansfor Iran Strikes,
supra note 6.
36. See, e.g., Blair, Remarks on Release of Iraq Dossier, supra note 29 (discussing such
perceived threats against the U.K.).
37.

See MICHAEL BYERS,

CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES

35-40 (1999).
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of particular importance in considering the future of international
use of force law because they are among the relatively few states in
the world against whom the horizontal enforcement mechanisms
of international law-i.e. issue linkaging, diplomatic or economic
pressuring, or direct military force-are unlikely to be effective
should they alternatively decide that acting in a way that is formally
in breach of the law is in their vital national interests, even if the
majority of states recognize the action as illegal.3 8 The 2003 Iraq
intervention is, again, a perfect example of this ability.
For all of these reasons, it is argued herein that it is possible for
the perceptions and actions of a relatively small subset of powerful
states to form the basis for a crisis in international use of force law.
It is further submitted, in agreement with former Secretary-General Annan's statements, that the current state of international use
of force law is indeed a state of crisis, the resolution of which is of
fundamental importance to the future of the United Nations and
to the U.N. Charter system for use of force regulation.
In his September 2003 remarks to the General Assembly, the
Secretary-General went on to discuss the founding ideals of the
U.N. Charter and to conclude, "[n] ow we must decide whether it is
possible to continue on the basis agreed then, or whether radical
changes are needed. And we must not shy away from questions
about the adequacy, and effectiveness of the rules and instruments
at our disposal." 39 There are indeed a number of possibilities for
reform or amendment of relevant provisions of use of force law
and the organs of the United Nations, many of which have been
proposed and discussed at length by others as alternatives for
bridging the gap and bringing the law into harmony with the realities of international security concerns, though none of the proposals has met with generalized approval among members of the
United Nations. 40 This Article will proceed by reviewing the most
38. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of InternationalLaw, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1823, 1860-72 (2002) (predicting and discussing when states might violate or comply
with international laws and norms); Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey
InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-58 (1997). Cf Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 187-204 (1993) (discussing generally possible motives for non-compliance and what determines an acceptable level of compliance
with treaties and norms).
39. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23,
2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.
40. See, e.g., Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposalsfor UN Security Council Reform, 99 Am.J. INT'L L.
632 (2005) (discussing 2004 U.N. panel recommendations for strengthening the U.N.);
Inocencio Arias, HumanitarianIntervention: Could the Security Council Kill the United Nations?,
23 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1005, 1026 (2000) (listing possible solutions to reform the U.N. veto
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noteworthy of these proposals, on the subjects of the composition
and decisionmaking processes of the Security Council, and the
construction and application of the law on self-defense contained
in Article 51.
It will then go on, however, to propose a somewhat different and
more revolutionary path which the international community could
choose to take in reforming the provision of international norms
in the area of international uses of force. This proposal would
involve a change to the fundamental character of the norms governing uses of force, to make them more practically useful to states
and more in keeping both with the demands of states for greater
flexibility in responding to threats, and with what will be argued to
be a more correct understanding of the proper role of international norms in this specific area of international relations. This
analysis will be based upon an understanding drawn from international legal theory that international law, in its current evolutionary
state, is better able to regulate some areas of international relations
through formal law than others; and the corollary understanding
that some areas of international relations are better given normative underpinning and standardization through the use of informal, non-binding norms.
The proposal will seek to use understandings from international
relations literature, particularly from the sub-field of liberal institutionalism, to show that such informal norms can still have a significant influence upon state action, and can be of significant aid to
states in overcoming the hindering forces of anarchy in international politics through the facilitation of cooperation. In fact, it
will argue that these norms can accomplish in the area of use of
force law virtually everything that formal rules can accomplish,
without causing the unnecessary negative collateral effects for the
rest of the formal corpus of international law which have been
occasioned by its breach by powerful states in highly publicized
and splashy instances of state interest non-alignment.

system);

FRANCK, supra note 15, at 4-5; THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR
21sT CENTURY (David Malone ed., 2004) (providing a history of the Security Council and attendant reform efforts); BARDO FASSBENDER, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND
THE RICHT OF VETO (1998) (describing various proposals for U.N. reform); REFORMING THE
UNITED NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS (Joachim Mfiller ed.,
2006) (setting forth a history of U.N. reform efforts).
TO THE
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II.

POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE

A.

The Security Council

Among proposals for amendment to the provisions and procedures of the U.N. Charter system for use of force regulation, none
has been more discussed than the idea of amending the makeup
and decisionmaking procedures of the Security Council in order to
make it a more credible, supportable and effective body in the
exercise of its authority granted under the U.N. Charter. 4 1 These
proposals essentially recognize that the 1945 political accord which
provided for a ten-member rotating membership of the Security
Council, plus the allocation of permanent member status and special veto rights to five specific states on the Council, is both unsatisfactory of modern ideas of democratic representation in
international organizations, and unreflective of modern realities of
states' power and influence.
Proposals for amendment of the Security Council have been
many and varied, but can be categorized in summary as proposals
for changing (a) the size of the Council; (b) the membership of
the Council; (c) the identity of permanent members of the Council
(if any); (d) the powers of permanent members; and (e) the procedures for Council decisionmaking.
One set of proposals for changing the size and membership of
the Security Council was made by the 2004 High-Level Panel
(Panel) Report. 42 The Panel concluded that a decision to enlarge
the Security Council's membership was "a necessity," and that it
should be guided primarily by principles of increased democratic
representation of U.N. members, particularly from the developing
world, and of accountability in decisionmaking. Realization of
these principles, it argued, was necessary for the Council to be seen
as a legitimate, credible body in taking decisions regarding interna43
tional uses of force.
The Panel produced two proposals for amendment to the size
and composition of the Security Council, involving a distribution
of seats among four regional areas: Africa, Asia and Pacific,
Europe, and the Americas. Under Model A, six new permanent
seats on the Council would be created along with three two-term
non-permanent seats, resulting in a revised overall Council mem41.
42.
43.

See, e.g., FASSBENDER, supra note 40, at 221-76; Blum, supra note 40, at 633-44.
A More Secure World, supra note 1,
248-53.
Id. 250.
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bership of 24 states, evenly divided among the four geographic
44
regions. (See Figure A)

Regional area
Africa
Asia and Pacific
Europe
Americas
Totals
model A

Proposed
Permanent seats Proposed new
two-year seats
No. of States (continuing) permanent seats (non-renewable) Total
53
56
47
35

0
1
3
1

2
2
1
1

4
3
2
4

6
6
6
6

191

5

6

13

24

As an alternative construction, under Model B no new permanent seats would be created, but eight four-year renewable-term
seats and one two-year non-permanent seat would be created, and
45
divided evenly among the four regions. (See Figure B)

Regional area
Africa
Asia and Pacific
Europe
Americas

Proposed
Proposed
Permanent seats
four-year
two-year seats
No. of States (continuing) renewable seats (non-renewable) Total
53
56
47
35

0
1
3
1

2
2
2
2

4
3
1
3

6
6
6
6

191

5

8

11

24

Totals
model B

Although the Panel's Model A proposed the creation of new permanent seats on the Council, it did not provide for veto powers for
those new permanent members, to equal the powers coincident
with permanent member status under the existing Charter structure. Indeed, neither model provided for either expansion of veto
powers or circumscription of the existing veto powers of permanent members. However, proposals from other sources have
included alternatives for revoking the veto rights of permanent
members entirely, or for establishing new decisionmaking rules for
the Council which would mediate the effect of permanent members' veto, such as by allowing a supermajority of the Security
Council to override the veto of one of the permanent members, or
requiring the Council to take up a measure for "second consideration" if it was first defeated by only one permanent member's veto.
44. Figures A and B reprinted from A More Secure World, supra note 1,
45. Id. 253.

252-53.
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In such a case of second consideration, the measure would only be
defeated by the votes of two permanent members. 4 6 These and
other proposals for amending the distribution of power among
Security Council members, and for changing the Council's voting
procedures, have been primarily aimed at improving the efficiency
of Security Council decisionmaking, and at decreasing instances of
stalemate in the Council and resultant inaction in the face of
threats.
A number of these proposals for amendment of the Security
Council and its decisionmaking procedures have received substantial political support, particularly on the issue of enlargement of
the Security Council. A number of alternative plans have been put
forward, and variously endorsed by groups of states, including
some existing permanent Council members. 47 There was some significant hope that the issue of Security Council enlargement would
be made part of the formal agenda for the United Nations' 2005
World Summit. However, this hope, as most hopes for progress in
United Nations reform efforts at the World Summit, was not
48
realized.
Even if politically possible, however, the problems with this
entire line of thinking in the counterproliferation-oriented preemption context are several and fundamental. For the Security
Council to fill the role of authorizer, through its Chapter VII powers, of counterproliferation-oriented preemptive uses of force, it
would have to be a forum in which member states were comfortable in sharing highly sensitive intelligence information, in order to
convince fellow Council members to support their application for
authorization. It would further have to be a body among whose
members there is likely to be substantial agreement regarding the
sources and characteristics of threats warranting preemptive uses
of force, so as to make states confident that efforts to work through
the Council would likely be successful and worth the transactions

46. See Arias, supra note 40, at 1026.
47. See UN Debates New Security Counci, BBC NEws, July 12, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/world/americas/4673977.stm.
48. See U.N. Reform Agenda Watered Down, CNN, Sept. 14, 2005, http://edition.cnn.
com/2005/us/09/14/un.reform/index.html. Secretary General Annan observed that
"[t]he big item missing is non-proliferation and disarmament. This is a real disgrace ...
when we are all concerned with weapons of mass destruction and that they may get into the
wrong hands." Id. (alteration in original).

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 40

costs and inevitable risks of intelligence leaking to the target entity
49
involved.
However, the Security Council does not meet either of these criteria as it is currently structured, and, more to the point, none of
the proposals which have been offered for amending it would serve
to substantially address these limitations of the institutional capacity of the Council to act in such cases. The intelligence which
states collect on WMD threats of a nature which causes them such
serious concern as to warrant a decision to use preemptive military
force is intelligence of the highest sensitivity, and will have been
collected through means the secrecy of which the collecting state
will protect at all costs. information of this sensitivity will simply
not be shared by states with a group as diverse as the Security
Council, no matter who the collecting state is. Sharing of intelligence of this degree of sensitivity sometimes occurs between the
closest of allies, for functional purposes, but would never be shared
either openly or confidentially to the general membership of the
Council or to U.N. staff. The risk of leakage to the target state, and
general risks of divulgence of sources and methods, is simply too
great with insufficient likely gain from the effort. Although there
have been proposals for the establishment of safeguards and confidence-building processes for sharing of intelligence within the
U.N. 5 0 , none of these are likely to satisfy states when dealing with
information of this level of sensitivity. An expanded Security Council membership, made regionally even more diverse, would further
decrease the likelihood of sensitive information being shared, and
thus further diminish the feasibility of the Security Council's filling
a meaningful role in authorizing counterproliferation-oriented
preemptions.
The second institutional limitation the Security Council faces in
this area again lies in the diversity of states comprising the Council's membership, and is the fact that members of the Security
Council differ fundamentally at times in their perception and
appreciation of WMD threats. Both the case of Iraq in 2003, as well
as the ongoing case of Iran are salient examples of such a divergence of views regarding both the existence and degree of imminence of WMD threats. In both cases it became clear to those
49.

See generally SIMON

CHESTERMAN, Lowv INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, SHARED

COLLECTIVE SECURITY (2006), available at http://iilj.org/
research/documents/chesterman shared secrets 2006.pdf (examining the possibilities
and difficulties of sharing intelligence in the context of collective security).
50. See id. at 32-38.
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permanent members of the Council that wished to pursue forceful
action under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter, that that
view was not shared by other permanent members of the Council.
Thus, in both cases, those wishing to pursue such forceful action,
51
elected to pursue that action outside of the Charter framework.
Although the Security Council acts as a body empowered with
special legal rights, such disagreements and resultant inability to
act as a body and to use those rights, are reminders that the Council is primarily an international political body, made up of states
with divergent and often conflicting interests and world views. The
expectation that such a group of states would in a consistent manner substantially agree in their perception of threats, so as to give
states confidence that applications to the Council for preemptive
force against WMD threats will likely find approval by nine members of the Council including all five permanent members, has little foundation. This fact argues against the prudential soundness
of the reliance placed upon the Security Council, as a body with
the capacity to act as an authorizer of preemptive uses of force, by
the 2004 High-Level Report as reflected in the Panel's statement
quoted above. 52 Again, proposals for increasing the size of the
Council and the number and diversity of its membership, would
only serve to exacerbate this problem further, and would make the
possibility of such consistent agreement less, not more, likely, and
thus further compromise the Council's ability to fulfill such a role.
It is argued herein that proposals for reform of the Security
Council and its procedures, with a purpose in making the Council
better able to function as an authorizer of counterproliferation-oriented preemptive uses of force, fail entirely to grasp the nettle of
the serious institutional limitations upon the Council's capacity to
act in this role. As shown above, the proposals which enjoy the
broadest political support, i.e. those for enlarging and diversifying
the Council's membership, would in fact produce effects retrograde to these aims. The 2004 High-Level Panel's Report emphasis
upon such amendment, and not upon more fundamental change
to the underlying rules of international use of force law, it is there53
fore submitted, is largely misplaced.
51. See Dafna Linzer, U.S. Urges FinancialSanctions on Iran, WASH. POST, May 29, 2006,
at Al; JOYNER, supra note 16.
52. See A More Secure World, supra note 1, 190 ("The short answer is that if there are
good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they
should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to.").
53. See id.
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Article 51

The other most frequently discussed area for possible amendment to the U.N. Charter system of use of force law, particularly in
consideration of the concerns some states have regarding WMD
proliferation and international terrorism, and the need for preemptive acts to address these threats, is the U.N. Charter law on
self-defense, contained in Article 51. 54 This provision and its relevance to debates regarding counterproliferation-oriented preemptive uses of force, including the argued inclusion from customary
law of a right of anticipatory self-defense within its broader interpretation, have been discussed above. As concluded through that

discussion, Article 51, even with its broader interpretation to
include the customary law right of anticipatory self-defense, is not
sufficient to legally justify preemptive strikes of the sort prescribed
by some powerful states' national counterproliferation policies.
The question of amendment thus becomes, is there some other
formulation of the right of self-defense which might be agreed by
states through amendment to the U.N. Charter or authoritative
process of interpretation of that document, or through the development of a more expansive right of anticipatory self-defense in
customary law, which would at once allow states the normative and
procedural flexibility they desire to legally justify unilateral acts of
force against developing WMD threats, while at the same time preserving an objectively verifiable rule of law on the subject of selfdefense in international law?
The strength of Article 51 as currently textually constructed is its
clarity, in establishing a "bright line" rule for unilateral selfdefense, requiring there to be an ex ante "armed attack" against a
state before it may invoke its temporary right of unilateral selfdefense and use force against the state or non-state actor that has
attacked it in order to repel the current attack and prevent further
attacks. This standard, although still controversial in the details of
its interpretation and application, does establish a fairly workable
standard in principle, that is capable of objective, independent
determination by other states ex ante, and by authoritative arbiters
ex post. However, this clarity and definition also comprise the
weakness of Article 51, as its provisions are applied to the modern
realities some states feel are present in their security calculations,
54.

Cf

W. DOYLE, STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION IN INTERNA30-42 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008) (discussing a variety of remedies for
the Security Council to address issues of preemptive acts).
MICHAEL

TIONAL CONFLICT
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and particularly with regard to the threat of use of WMD as discussed above.
In considering possibilities for amendment to Article 51, states
with counterproliferation-oriented preemptive strike policies likely
would wish for either formal amendment or authoritative re-interpretation through subsequent state practice, to produce a right of
anticipatory self-defense which allows for a preemptive attack when
a state has evidence (perhaps even if only circumstantial, and likely
not open to review by other states) of WMD development or possession by another state or non-state actor, and a reasonable basis
in fact (perhaps comprised largely by historical antipathy, and
prior examples of aggressive acts or "ties" to terrorist organizations) to suspect that those WMD might be used to threaten them
at some point in the future. This standard sounds vague and indeterminate because it is vague and indeterminate, but in reality it is
the sort of normative construction that would be necessary in order
to justify the preemptive acts of force contemplated by some
55
national counterproliferation policies and official statements.
This level of vagueness and subjectivity with regard to evidentiary
standards, burden of evidentiary production, perception of threat
and imminence of threat, is precisely what would be required in
order to give such states the legal flexibility they would need to
pursue such policies.
However, flexibility and vagueness in law on the one hand, and
predictability and verifiability in law on the other, are very difficult
to engineer simultaneously into the same legal provision. 56 As the
vagueness and subjectivity of the right of self-defense increases
through such flexible construction, so the ability of other states to
judge ex ante, and authoritative arbiters to judge ex post the compliance of the action with the normative standard, decreases in
measure. In a similar variance, as this ability of third parties to
adjudge the compliance of a self-defending state's action with the
applicable international legal standard decreases, so in proportion

55.
EGY OF

For an example of such a statement, see THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATTHE USA 15 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/

index.html ("We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.").
56. See generally TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICO-r, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000) (arguing that
vagueness and indeterminacy in the law fail to create predictability and verifiability, frustrating the rule of law); OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS (Brian Leiter ed., 2000) (exploring
the idea that vagueness in law can lead to an increase in the role of morality in interpreting
the law, which in turn questions the objectivity of law).
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does the character of that standard as a rule of law. 57 As conceded
above, the existing law of self-defense contained in Article 51 is,
despite being an overall workable standard in principle, controversial enough in its discrete application to facts. Increasing the level
of normative vagueness and subjectivity of its provisions would
serve only to exacerbate this problem.
Added to this problem of effective norm construction, is the
institutional problem within the international legal system of the
relative absence of practical means of authoritative adjudication of
disputes, including those regarding use of force law generally and
self-defense law in particular. 58 This problem is of course essentially the product of the voluntary jurisdictional basis of international judicial bodies such as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), and the election by many states not to accede to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 59 This ability of states to avoid the jurisdiction of international judicial bodies on questions of self-defense
law has significantly hampered the development of authoritative
interpretations of the provisions of Article 51 and their consistent
application, notwithstanding the fact that they are, as previously
discussed, relatively straightforward. An expansive and more flexible rule of anticipatory self-defense will only increase controversies
regarding the correct interpretation of the law, as an authoritative
interpreter is effectively absent.
The difficulty of satisfactory rule construction in the area of selfdefense, and the international legal system's incapacity to adjudicate self-defense rules effectively, taken together, make reliance on
amendment of Article 51 to include a broader, more flexible right
of anticipatory self-defense unlikely to be the answer to the crisis
caused by powerful states' desires to pursue policies of counterproliferation-oriented preemption in disharmony with existing
international use of force law.

57. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553 (2001)
58. See Charles Lipson, Why are Some InternationalAgreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG.
495, 505-506 (1991) (discussing the relative absence of authoritative adjudication of disputes). See generally Gray, supra note 25 (discussing the International Court of Justice's
reluctance to adjudicate authoritatively in use of force cases).
59.

See

DANIEL JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF

MASS DESTRUCTION

(forthcoming 2009).
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III.

DEFORMALIZATION

A.

Overstretching

Neither amendment of the Security Council's membership or its
procedures, nor reconstitution or reinterpretation of self-defense
law under Article 51 seem to hold much promise for meaningful
resolution of the crisis caused by the gap between law and reality at
the nexus of states' counterproliferation policies and international
use of force law. Indeed there seem to be no real prospects for
amendment to the Charter, or to related customary law on the use
of force that could address effectively both the desires of states with
counterproliferation policies for normative flexibility, and the
requirements of those interested in international law as a legal system for such amended provisions governing use of force to possess
the important rule-of-law characteristics of predictability and objective verifiability.
It is argued herein that this crisis, which appears to be un-resolvable through amendment to the formal sources of international
use of force law, exposes in salient fashion an underlying but longignored truth about the jus ad bellum. This is that, at the current
state of evolution of its sources and institutions of adjudication and
enforcement, international law as a legal system simply doesn't
have either the normative or structural tools necessary to govern
this area of international interaction, i.e. international use of force
by states, in a credible and supportable way.
This truth was obscured for forty-five years by the coincident,
cotemporaneous existence in international politics of bi-polar
power dynamics and the possession by the two Cold War powers of
nuclear arsenals, which produced an antagonistic but relatively stable international security situation because of the powerful escalating dynamic of mutually assured destruction. 60 This dynamic,
which could be triggered by even the most minor initial transgression between a superpower and the client state of the other superpower (for example the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962), kept serious
international conflicts in any way involving powerful states to a
61
minimum.
60.

See Kenneth Waltz, More May be Better, in ScoTT D. SAGAN & KENNETH N. WALTZ,
3, 7 (2d ed. 2003).
61. See LvLE GOLDSTEIN, PREvENTrIvE ATTACK AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 14 (2006); Erich Weede, Extended Deterrence, Superpower
Control, and Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1962-1976, 26J. PEACE RES. 7, 10 (1989).
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 40

This, of course, was also the founding ideal of the United
Nations: the prevention of uses of force by powerful states against
less-powerful states. The prevention of war between powerful states
themselves was of course the ultimate objective of the Charter
framers, who had lived through the devastation of two world wars
involving armed conflict between powerful states, but they recognized that wars initiated between powerful states are rare because
of the high costs involved and resulting deterrent effect. They realized that, as in the case of the previous two world wars, conflict
between powerful states is more often precipitated by powerful
states' conflict with and use of force against less powerful states and
non-state actors which, because of alliances with other powerful
states or the threat of further spread of influence and power which
might eventually threaten them, draws other powerful states into
the conflict and results in powerful states being pitted against each
62
other.
Because of this empirical record of superpower stability during
the Cold War, many lauded the success of the U.N. Charter system
for use of force regulation as having had a causal effect in producing this result. 63 The change to the empirical data produced after
the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s however, during which
uses of force by powerful states against less powerful states became
more frequent, casts significant doubt upon such attributions of
success to the United Nations system. 64 This increase in the frequency of armed conflicts involving powerful states argues strongly
that the attribution of causation to the United Nations use of force
system as having been a primary independent variable affecting the
relatively inactive period of powerful state use of force during the
Cold War, was in fact a specious claim, and that the observed reluctance of powerful states to use force during this period was more
62. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 17, at 119-20
(discussing indirect force and asserting that Art. 2(4) extends to indirect force); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 44-45; David M. Malone, Introductionto THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 40, at 1-13 ("The Council
initially viewed its role as preventing a third world war. As the Cold War came to define
global politics, the Council moved to tackle prevention of regional conflicts (often
between client states or proxies of the superpowers) from spilling into a global
conflagration.").
63. See Charles Kegley & Gregory Raymond, InternationalLegal Norms and the Preservation of Peace, 1820-1964: Some Evidence and BivariateRelationships, 8 INT'L INTERACTIONS 171,
180-82 (1981) (providing empirical data regarding superpower stability); H.R. Tillema &
J.R. Van Wingen, Law and Power in Military Intervention, 26 INT'L STUD. Q. 220 (1982).
64. See DOYLE, supra note 54, at 24-25. See generally MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS:
ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA (2001); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61; John J. Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, THE ATLANTIC, August 1990, at 35.
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validly explained by larger contextual geopolitical forces and not
65
by the effect of international use of force law upon state behavior.
The post-September 11 climate of concern regarding international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, and the resulting
change in emphasis in many powerful states' national security policies to counterproliferation strategies in disharmony with the U.N.
Charter system, foreshadows a continuation of this increased incidence of powerful states' use of force against less powerful states.
Large-scale actions similar to the 2003 Iraq intervention, as well as
smaller-scale breaches of sovereignty as per the Proliferation Security Initiative, will likely continue to occur in coming decades in the
name of counterproliferation, as powerful states try to slow the
inevitable spread of WMD to states and non-state actors of concern
to them. 66 As these high-profile breaches of international use of
force law continue to occur over the protestation of the majority of
states, they will do more and more damage to the perceived credibility not only of international use of force law and the U.N. Charter system, but to the rest of the formal corpus of international law
as well.
65. SeeJoseph Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 Irr'L ORG. 485, 491 (1988);John J. Mearsheimer,
The False Promise of InternationalInstitutions,19 INT'L SEC. 5, 14, 33 (1994). This is not to say
that use of force law as codified in the U.N. Charter has no effect as an independent
variable upon state action. See IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY. LEGITIMACY & POWER IN THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

6, 13, 14 (2007). Rather, it is to say that use of force

law was not a significant independent variable producing Cold War stability. The argument will be made herein that international norms can matter, even in the area of international use of force, although norms of a hard law character are inappropriate for
regulation of this area currently. In summary, the argument herein is that soft law will
matter as an independent variable in this area as much as any norms can matter in this
area currently.

66.

GOLDSTEIN,

supra note 61, at 155.

Reconsidering the possible constraints on a given superior power, note that in the
post-Cold War world, the United States is not likely to be limited by an adversary's
conventional strength, as was often the case in the Cold War. . . . Nor is the
proliferator likely to find effective alliance partners, since there is no longer any
alternative superpower. These two conditions are the defining elements of the
post-Cold War international system. We must consider that only norms and geography are left to constrain the United States from fighting a series of volatile
counterproliferation wars. These conditions existed before 11 September 2001,
and before the articulation of the Bush Doctrine. The September 11 terror
attacks appear to have significantly weakened norms in U.S. political culture that
discourage preventive attack. Therefore, the post-September 11 world has witnessed a further exaggeration of the instability resulting from radical asymmetry
in WMD rivalries. The U.S. military has been working for well over a decade at
digesting the lessons of the early 1990s, actively preparing for contests with
regional adversaries.
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Thus, it is argued herein that international lawyers and governments must finally come to terms with the reality of the structural
capacities and limitations of the international legal system in the
area of use of force regulation, and rigorously and honestly
reassess what international use of force law can and cannot be
expected to accomplish, as well as the costs to the perceived credibility of the rest of the formal corpus of international law which will
be sustained through continued unwarranted excess in these
expectations. It is argued that this crisis moment reveals fundamental problems with the application of the formal sources of
international law to this area of international interaction, and that
a more elemental reconceptualization of the prudential character
and attributes of international norms regulating uses of force is
required.
It must be remembered that international use of force law is a
relatively late development in the history of international law, only
reaching its maturity in a broad, multilateral prohibition on the
use of force as part of the post-World War II renaissance of reliance
upon international norms and institutions, after the profound
skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the Kellogg-Briand Pact
and the League of Nations during the late inter-war years. 67 As
with a number of the other new projects which expanded exponentially the range of international interaction covered by international law during this time (e.g. international criminal law and
international human rights law), international use of force law was
an idealistic extension of the formal sources of international law,
born from the hope of using international standards of behavior to
dissuade states from engaging in the sorts of actions which, in the
words of the U.N. Charter Preamble, had "twice in our lifetime...
brought untold sorrow to mankind .. "68
It was hoped that, as with the other more traditional areas of
international legal coverage, even unwilling states would self-interestedly comply with these rules because of the expectations of the
broader international community and resulting issue linkages to
their economic prosperity, and because of the power of the states
67.

See Gerry Simpson, The Situation on the Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules and the

Rule of Power, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 439, 448-49 (2000). See generally STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND
THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 288, 314-56 (Cambridge University Press 2005)

(setting forth a broad discussion of the U.N. Charter in the post-war context).
68. U.N. Charter pmbl. See generally Oscar Schachter, The UN Legal Order: An Overview,
in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (ChristopherJoyner ed., 1997) (discussing the development of use of force law, including examples of the use of international

standards or norms to dissuade the proliferation on WMD).
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which had established the U.N. Charter and which took the five
permanent seats on the Security Council. However, this was by far
the furthest extension of the idea of regulating international
behavior through binding legal norms, and would be the greatest
test of the horizontal pressuring forces which had been relatively
effective in producing compliance with international rules governing navigation and trade by sea, diplomatic relations, and terri69
torial acquisition and boundaries for centuries.
The post Cold War history of powerful state uses of force, and
particularly that history since September 11, 2001, culminating in
the present crisis between law and reality on the subject of counterproliferation-oriented preemption, is evidence that this most sensitive area of international relations has exceeded the regulating
capacity of the formal sources of international law, and the normative and structural limitations of international law as a legal system.70 The absence both of effective and reliable means for
adjudication of disputes by international judicial bodies and of
effective vertical enforcement mechanisms upon powerful states,
while not crippling to the effective regulation of these other areas
of international .interaction through the sources of international
law and horizontal pressure and issue-linkage-based compliance
forces, renders international use of force law both normatively and
structurally incapable of effectively regulating its subject matter. In
sum, international use of force law is simply an overstretching of
the competencies of formal international law.
B.

InternationalLegal Theory

To explain this conclusion further, it will be necessary to briefly
review a number of prominent jurisprudential theories on the
validity of international law. The oldest of these, and one which
still provides the underpinning for many fundamental rules of
international law, is the idea that the validity of legal rules is based
upon principles existing apart from human creation, and discoverable by human reason, whether emanating from the divine or simply inherent in the natural order of human society. 71 This natural
69. See ANDREW GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 149-50, 164 (2008). See
generally Chayes & Chayes, supra note 38 (discussing generally possible motives for compliance and non-compliance); Koh, supra note 38.
70. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 61, at 155 (discussing U.S. policy after 09/11).
71. See generally M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCrION TO JURiSPRUDENCE (7th ed.
2001) (discussing natural law); Stephen Hall, The PersistentSpectre: NaturalLaw, International
Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 269, 273-74 (2001) (discussing
enlightenment naturalism); INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAw
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law tradition was the sole conception of legal validity of both
domestic and international law up until the nineteenth century,
and is most prominently associated with scholars from antiquity
including Cicero and St. Augustine, then with medieval scholastics
including notably Thomas Aquinas, then with later medieval and
enlightenment scholars including Hugo Grotius and Samuel von
Pufendorf.
While subject to significant variations in theme through the centuries, the basic idea of this school of jurisprudential thought is
that the validity of law or of a legal system in its entirety is based
upon the harmony of the substantive rules themselves with higher
principles of the jus naturale. While not wholly representative of all
variations of natural law theory, the Thomist maxim lex injustia non
est lex gives an indication of this connection between the substance
of law and principles of justice or morality contained in the
philosophiaperennis, commonly associated with natural law theory.
It is from this natural law foundation that international law incorporated fundamental rules such as pacta sunt servanda, or the obligation to comply with treaty commitments, as well as a host of
72
other "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
The empirical revolution in the scholarly sciences in the nineteenth century contributed to the maturation, and eventual dominance over natural law theory, of legal positivism. Legal positivism,
as developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, and as revised
particularly with regard to international law by Georg Jellinek and
Heinrich Triepel, holds that the primary validity of international
law is based in the processes of its creation, and not upon the con73
formity of its substance with higher principles of morality. Positivism severed the necessary connection of law with justice, and
focused inquiries concerning validity upon the consent of sovereign states, expressed either explicitly or implicitly, to be bound to
international obligations. 74 Legal positivism accepts only such
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (RobertJ. Beck, et al. eds., 1996) (discussing various rules
of international law); RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (1999) (discussing
natural rights and duties).
72. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1).
73. See GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (3rd ed. 1914); HEINRICH TRIEPEL,
VOLKERRECHT UND LANDSRECHT (1899); FREEMAN, supra note 71, at 201-08 (discussing Ben-

tham and Austin); Hall, supra note 71, at 282-84 (discussing Jellinek and Triepel); Legal
Positivism, in INTERNATIONAL RULES, supra note 71, at 52; TUCK, supra note 71.
74. See generally M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed.

2001) (discussing natural law); Stephen Hall, The PersistentSpectre: NaturalLaw, International
Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 269, 273-74 (2001) (discussing
enlightenment naturalism); INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW
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empirically verifiable processes, and objectively discernible rules
created as a result thereof, as having the character of international
law.
Earlier positivist writings, and particularly those of John Austin,
further required consistent and reliable sanctions from a hierarchical sovereign as punishment for breach of rules, as a definitional
requirement for validity of a legal system. It was on this subject
that, according to Austin, international law failed as a legal system,
'75
and was classed by him simply as a form of "positive morality.
Later positivists, culminating in the work of H.L.A. Hart, rejected
this narrow view of the role of coercion in the requisite characteristics of a valid legal system. According to Hart there is a meaningful
difference to be had between the validity of rules which states are
obliged (i.e. coerced) to obey, and the validity of those which they
are obligated (i.e. normatively bound) to obey. Hart focused his
inquiries into validity upon the obligations of states and not upon
rules which force alone-which Hart equated to rules enforced by
gangsters-motivates them to obey. Nevertheless, Hart concluded
that because international law was composed only of primary, substantive rules, and lacked important secondary or structural/institutional rules regulating the administration of the primary rules, it
was not a valid legal system, but rather simply a collection of valid
76
legal rules.
Notwithstanding the doubts of some influential positivist writers
regarding the validity of international law, either as a legal system
or simply as legal rules, and despite the lingering presence of rules
of international law which could only be explained by reference to
natural law theory, 77 positivism from the late nineteenth century,
and continuing to the present time, became the primary theory
which international lawyers used to validate their legal science. 7
Pursuant to positivism's focus on the process of law creation, international lawyers grounded the validity of the sources of international law upon state consent, and found this consent to be present
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (RobertJ. Beck, et al. eds., 1996) (discussing various rules
of international law); RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (1999) (discussing
natural rights and duties).
75. John Austin, The ProvinceofJurisprudenceDetermined, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 336, 351 (Clarence Morris, ed., 1971).
76. H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d ed., 1994).
77. Including the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda,which mandates observance of treaty
commitments, and rules of customary international law and general principles of law, only
the manifestations and not the substance of which can be explained by legal positivism. See
Hall, supra note 71, at 285-86, 298-99.
78. See Morgenthau, supra note 33.
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(although at times through tortured logical processes) in rules created by treaties, customary law, and general principles.
In his earlier writings, before turning his back on international
law and playing a founding role in developing realist political
thought after World War II, Hans Morgenthau developed a theory
which, although ostensibly rejecting positivism out of hand as the
primary theory of validity of international law, incorporated both
elements of natural law and Austinian legal positivism to form what
Morgenthau referred to as a "functionalist theory" of international
law. 79 In his functionalist theory, Morgenthau criticizes legal posi-

tivism as being at once both too narrow and too broad to fully
explain the validity of international law. Too narrow because it
does not include recognition of "ethico-legal" principles and other
considerations (e.g. pacta sunt servanda) which are a part of the
corpus of international law. Too broad because it mandates the
inclusion in the corpus of international law of rules which have
been enacted by states through positivist processes, but that are not
in harmony with the actual practice of states.
He identifies this excessive breadth as a gap between law and
reality, in which the law recognizes rules which states create
through consent, but with which they do not in fact comply, and is
critical of international lawyers for having allowed such a gap to
come into existence. As he wrote in 1940:
If an event in the physical world contradicts all scientific forecasts, and thus challenges the assumptions on which the forecasts have been based, it is the natural reaction of scientific
inquiry to reexamine the foundations of the specific science and
attempt to reconcile scientific findings and empirical facts. The
social sciences do not react in the same way. They have an inveterate tendency to stick to their assumptions and to suffer constant defeat from experience rather than to change their
assumptions in the light of contradicting facts. This resistance
to change is uppermost in the history of international law....
Instead of asking whether the devices were adequate to the
problems which they were supposed to solve, it was the general
attitude of the internationalists to take the appropriateness of
80
the devices for granted and to blame the facts for the failure.
Morgenthau rather proposes a theory of validity which takes into
account the relationship of law with wider social and political
forces which form the context in which states exist. This theory, he
argues, has the ability not only to make legally valid those ethico79.
80.

See generally id. (setting out this theory).
Id. at 260.
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legal principles which are accepted as law by states, but which positivism cannot countenance, but also to exclude from the formal
corpus of valid international law those rules which positivism does
sanction, but which are not observed by states.
Whereas natural law focused on the substance of rules and positivism focused on the processes of rule creation, Morgenthau's
functionalism places primacy upon the application of rules of law
to state practice, and particularly upon the capacity of the legal
system to consistently and predictably enforce compliance with
substantive legal rules.8 As he states:
A rule of international law does not, as positivism was prone to
believe, receive its validity from its enactment into a legal instrument, as, for instance, an international treaty. There are rules
of international law which are valid, although not enacted in
such legal instruments, and there are rules of international law
which are not valid, although enacted in such instruments....
A rule, be it legal, moral, or conventional, is valid when its violation is likely to be followed by an unfavorable reaction, that is, a
sanction against its violator. An alleged rule, the violation of
which is not followed by such a sanction,
is a mere idea, a wish, a
82
suggestion, but not a valid rule.

81. See the more recent re-iteration of this idea in Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory
of InternationalLaw, supra note 38. Additional scholarship on the issue of the relationship
between international law and state compliance includes GuzMAN, How INTERNATIONAL
LAW WORKS, supra note 69; ABRAM CInAEs & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (discussing
strategies for managing compliance); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS
BEYOND BORDERS: ADvocAcY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (discussing the
influence of transnational advocacy networks in international politics); Mark A. Chinen,
Game Theory and Customary InternationalLaw: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner,23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 143 (2001) (arguing that "international law can continue to be used
instrumentally to enhance international cooperation"); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in
the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988) (discusses "why states obey laws in the
absence of coercion"); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization
and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621 (2004); Oona A. Hathaway, Between
Power and Principle:An Integrated Theory of InternationalLaw, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 469 (2005)
(explaining why states commit to and comply with treaties, and how treaties influence or
fail to influence state behavior); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is InternationalHuman Rights
Law Enforced, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999) (contending that states enforce international
human rights law through a transnational legal process); Koh, supra note 38 (exploring the
motivations underlying compliance and non-compliance with international law).
82. Morgenthau, supra note 33, at 276. This does at first glance look like a simple
restatement of Austin, but it differs in important ways. First, Austin would not have recognized the legal validity of ethico-legal principles as Morgenthau does. Second, Austin
would not have accepted the sanctions Morgenthau discusses as genuine sanctions, as they
do not necessarily flow vertically downwards from a sovereign. Rather, Morgenthau
accepts Triepel's identification of the sovereign in the international legal order as being
the community of states. He thus accepts horizontal sanctions as providing for the definitional element of enforcement in functionalist theory.
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Each of these jurisprudential theories, which can only be briefly
summarized here, has persuasive power in partially explaining the
validity of modern international law. Natural law still is the only
theory that can account for the foundational rule of pacta sunt servanda as well as the binding nature of both customary law and general principles of law. 83 Legal positivism, however, importantly
removes the primary explanation for the sources of international
law from the subjectivity of natural law's metaphysical underpinnings and grounds validity in state consent, analogously in accord
with mature domestic legal systems.
However, on the question of prudential areas of coverage for the
formal corpus of international law and the potential problem of
overstretching identified above, Morgenthau's functionalism is
most useful. This is because, as is evident from the continuing
necessity of appealing to natural law to account for validity of some
fundamental aspects of its normative structure, international law, if
a legal system at all, is in its embryonic developmental stages as
compared to mature domestic legal systems.8 4 At this stage of its
evolution, care must be taken not to relegate to the coverage of
formal international law those areas of international interaction
which are beyond the capacity of the sources and structures of the
international legal system to regulate effectively. Doing so, as
argued above, will only damage the credibility and perceived legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, and thereby slow or potentially
permanently derail its evolutionary progress.
In keeping with the functionalist approach advocated by Morgenthau, therefore, the overstretching argument above with regard
to jus ad bellum can be restated as follows. The non-compulsory
jurisdiction of judicial bodies and horizontal enforcement
processes which international law has always depended upon to
produce compliance can be expected to work well in relatively low
politics areas, where expectations of reciprocity are strong and the
likely cost of compliance is fairly low. Within this category may be
grouped most of the traditional areas of international legal coverage. However, these enforcement processes should not be
expected to work well in high politics areas, where issues concern
vital national survival and prosperity interests, and where the
expectation of reciprocity is dubious and costs of compliance are
potentially high. The paradigmatic example of such an issue area
83.
84.

See Hall, supra note 71, at 298-99.
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Nature of InternationalLaw, in LAW
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 27, 54 (Hans Kelsen ed., 1942).
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in the latter category is state use of international force, particularly
8 5
in self-defense.
It is important to clarify that most areas of international law, i.e.
particularly those part of the formal corpus of international law
before World War II, do qualify as valid law even under Morgenthau's functionalist criteria. In most of these areas it is realistic to
expect some meaningful sanction (including loss of trust and reputation, issue linkaging, economic sanctions, and military force at
the most extreme) albeit horizontally, which is likely to produce
compliance.8 6 But it is important to understand that these forces
are likely to produce compliance in these areas because states are not
far away from compliance to begin with, meaning the cost of compliance, even when states think their short-term interests are better
served by breaching, is seen to be outweighed by the long-term
benefits of compliance, and thus they are more easily pressured
into line. Again, in these areas the political and economic stakes in
each instance are relatively low and the cost of compliance with the
relevant international rules is also relatively low. These factors,
along with an expectation of reciprocal compliance by other states
which, along with their own compliance results in the efficiencies
designed to be produced by the normative regime, are likely to
provide sufficient bases for choosing to comply.
Use of force as an issue area candidate for international legal
coverage presents a very different set of decisionmaking calculi for
states when considering compliance, however. The above listed
horizontal pressuring forces shouldn't be expected to produce
compliance with incongruous international rules by a state considering using force, if that state considers that its vital national interests of security and prosperity are at stake and can only be
safeguarded through the use of force. This is particularly true if
the state is powerful, and can therefore expect to deter and at the
extreme resist the application of such sanctions, up to and including military force, imposed by other states. In such a case, the state
will reasonably consider that the cost of compliance with the rule
(when its judgment is that doing so will threaten its vital national
interests) will be too great to be offset by long-term benefits of
compliance. This is particularly the case in such areas of high
85.

See Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of InternationalLaw, supra note 38, at 1883.

86.

See GUzMAN, How INrERNATIONAL LAw WoRKS, supra note 69, at 9, 33 (arguing

that reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation concerns "provide states with an incentive to
comply with international legal studies"); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 38, at 203 (providing several examples); Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of InternationalLaw, supra note
38, at 1886-87; Koh, supra note 38.
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politics and national sovereignty sensitivity, because states will not
expect other states to reciprocally comply in similar situations, but
will expect those states also to breach in furtherance of their perceived vital self-interest. Thus, there is not the reasonable expectation in reciprocity producing the efficiencies the system was
designed to produce-in this case international peace and secur87
ity-that there is in lower-politics areas.
The unlikelihood of the normatively indeterminate, horizontal
pressure forces of the international legal system producing compliance, particularly by powerful states in the area of state uses of
force, therefore results in the invalidity of international use of
force law, according to Morgenthau's critique.
C.

Hard and Soft InternationalLaw

Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith's recent book entitled "The
Limits of International Law" approaches the question of the limitations of international law as a legal system from a very different
direction-that of international relations theory and specifically
rational choice analysis. 88 They argue that international law is
essentially epiphenomenal, that it is the product of states' interests
and power, and that it does not meaningfully influence state action
except through the limited role of defining the relationship
between states at any given moment which has been agreed upon
as optimal for states' coordination or cooperation. They reject any
"noninstrumental" (e.g. belief that compliance is the most legitimate option or is required by concerns of moral principle, including the greater good) considerations for state compliance with
international law. According to their model, since states will only
comply with international law when they perceive it to be in their
interests to do so, expectations for the usefulness of international
law in influencing state behavior and in producing positive results
in international interactions beyond what states feel is justified by
their short-term interests to achieve, should be modest.
Posner and Goldsmith's model is quite a strict version of rationalism, and shares with other rational choice literature the fundamental flaw of insufficiently clarifying the distinction between short
87.

See ROBERT ScoTr & PAUL STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY

AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

19-20 (2006).

(2005). But
see GuzMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAw WORKS, supra note 69, at 12-13 (using a rational
choice model to argue that international law does affect state behavior and plays an important role "in facilitating cooperation among states").
88.

ERIC POSNER & JACK GOLDSMITH, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
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term and long term, or micro and macro state interests, and of
failing to consider the impact of this distinction upon their analysis, in this case of the usefulness of international law.8 9 Their conclusion that international law should not be expected to cause
states to act contrary to their interests is produced because of their
very narrow definition of state interest, which essentially only
includes short term or micro state interests, and excludes longer
term or macro state interests such as interests in order, peace, and
prosperity. It is these macro interests which states have traditionally sought to secure through the development of international
law, and which states have traditionally been willing to sacrifice
their short term interests to achieve. International law can therefore better be explained as having a reflective, two-way relationship
of causal effect, in that it is created out of states' long term interests, but also serves to reflect these long term or macro interests
back upon international interactions in order to limit states'
actions which seek to serve short term or micro interests undermining of these original long term or macro interests.
However, this generalized discussion of state interests with
regard to international law highlights precisely another significant
circumscription of the explanatory power of Posner and Goldsmith's model. In furnishing their "comprehensive analysis of
international law" Posner and Goldsmith make no distinction in
the operation of international law, and the role of states' power
and interest in that operation, as between substantive areas of its
coverage. As discussed previously, the interest calculations
involved in state decisionmaking can be substantially different
depending on which set of issues form the context for that decision. This is because the issue context will be largely determinate
of both the nature and scope of the state interests involved, which
in turn determines the cost-benefit calculus for states, as well as
states' expectations of reciprocity. Posner and Goldsmith's generalized treatment of the role of states' power and interest in the operation of international law makes for a much less sophisticated
explanatory theory than one which takes account of the differences
between the highly varied international issue areas combined
under international law's regulatory remit, and their particular
89. See Robert Cryer, The Limits of Objective Rationalism, 82 INT'L Asr. 183, 185-86
(2006) (book review) (criticizing Posner and Goldsmith's approach to distinguishing short
and long-term interests); Martti Koskenniemi, The Placeof Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 455 (1996); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1999).
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respective requirements for and susceptibilities to international
normative regulation.
The only literature in international relations which has
attempted to explain the operation of international norms in a
manner capable of distinguishing between substantive areas of
international interaction is the excellent legalization thesis developed by Robert Keohane, et al. in a special issue of International
Organizationin 2000, and particularly as applied by Kenneth Abbott
and Duncan Snidal in their article entitled "Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance." 90 The legalization thesis posits that
formalization, or legalization, in the structure of international institutions can be separated into at least three broad sub-categoriesobligation, precision, and delegation-the sum of the relative presence of each being the functional determinant of the degree of
legalization present in the regime. As described by Keohane, et al.:
"Legalization" refers to a particular set of characteristics that
institutions may (or may not) possess. These characteristics are
defined along three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligationmeans that states or other actors are bound by
a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, it means that they are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to
scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of
international law, and often of domestic law as well. Precision
means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they
require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and
apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules. 9 1
The legalization thesis essentially advances the idea that formalization or legalization of international interactions happens along a
spectrum, with the place of any particular issue-specific regime
along that spectrum being determined by the relative presence in
the international norms addressing that regime of these three
determinants, and not according to the rigid law/non-law distinc92
tion imposed by classical international legal theory.
Abbott and Snidal proceed to apply this thesis by reviewing the
advantages and disadvantages of hard law (i.e. legally binding commitments), as compared to soft law (i.e. non-legally binding com90.

See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in Interna-

tional Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 421 (2000).

91.

Robert Keohane et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401 (2000)

(alteration in original).

92. See Lipson, supra note 58, at 508.
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mitments), and arguing that international actors deliberately
choose the character of the form of normative regulation they wish
to address an area of international interaction on the basis of the
particularities of that issue area and the appropriateness of the
form of regulation, either hard or soft, to regulate those particular
circumstances.
Thus they argue that hard law will be chosen in issues areas
where priority has been placed upon maximizing the credibility of
commitments and minimizing future transactions costs associated
with renegotiation of commitments, and where problems of incomplete contracting can be addressed through hard law because of
the existence of substantial consensus on general principles, notwithstanding the difficulty of predicting specific applications. They
argue that soft law, by contrast, will be chosen to address areas of
international interaction in which costs of initial contracting are
high, where sovereignty costs are potentially severe (as in issue
areas involving national security), where uncertainty of the issue
area is high (as through dynamic technological change), and
where necessity of compromise is great due to fundamental dis93
agreements over principles.

93. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 90, at 429-40. With regard to arms control agreements, inclusive of the nonproliferation law treaties, the Abbott & Snidal analysis appears
to place such agreements somewhat further down the spectrum towards the appropriateness of hard law regulation, noting that "states should use hard legalization to increase the
credibility of commitments when noncompliance is difficult to detect, as in most arms
control situations." Id. at 429. They note that, while arms control treaties are understandable uses of formality of commitment as a regulatory vehicle, they tend also to be "minimally
institutionalized." Id. at 440. To phrase the point in terms of their three factors, arms
control agreements tend to be high in obligation and low in both precision and delegation. See id. at 429-40 (2000) (finding delegation is only "moderate" even in NATO, the
"most institutionalized alliance ever"). See generally Richard T. Cupitt and Wiliam J. Long,
Multilateral Cooperation and Nuclear Nonproliferation, in THE PROLIFERATION PUZZLE: WHY
NUcLEAR WEAPONS SPREAD AND WHAT RESULTS (Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel,
eds., 1993) (discussing the differing approaches taken to combat nuclear proliferation and
their similarities to hard law and soft law); Joseph Grieco, Understandingthe Problem of Institutional Cooperation, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 317-21
(David A. Baldwin ed., 1993); LISA L. MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 3-8 (1993); Arthur Stein, Coordination and Collaboration:
Regimes in an Anarchic World, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY
DEBATE 33, 46-9 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993); George Bunn and David Holloway, Arms
Controlwithout Treaties? Stanford University CISAC Working Paper, 1998) (contrasting arms
control treaties, which are "formally negotiated [and] legally binding" with reciprocal unilateral measures). For an examination of the multilateral export control regimes by reference to the Abbott & Snidal model, see Daniel H. Joyner, Restructuringthe MultilateralExport
ControlRegime System, 9J. Conflict & Sec. L. 181 (2004) (examining the multilateral export
control regime by reference to the Abbott & Sindal model).

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 40

Applying the "spectrum" model of the legalization thesis, and
being guided by the Abbott and Snidal analysis, there would
appear to be no more persuasive candidate for international normative regulation through deformalized soft law, or non-binding
commitments, than the issue area of international uses of force, as
particularly manifest in the lesser included issue area of international uses of force against WMD threats. If the gap between law
and reality in this area is accepted, as also therefore the need for
some normative change, then the daunting prospect of some new
multilateral binding agreement on use of force law presents a case
of extremely high initial contracting costs for instituting this
change in hard law. Sovereignty costs in this issue area are clearly
at their zenith, due to modern threats to national security including the potential and very real threat of use of WMD against states
by other states and non-state actors. The issue area is highly uncertain, in that the necessities of normative regulation have evolved
and continue to evolve as influenced by the dynamic changes to
both the means of violence and to the political and economic phenomena (e.g. the facilitation of WMD dual use trade through the
forces of globalization) which shape the threats facing states. And
the fundamental disagreements among states concerning principles of legitimate self-defense, particularly on the subject of
counterproliferation-oriented preemptive strikes as described
above, heighten the need for normative compromise in this area.
Thus, all of the criteria for prudential application of soft law,
94
instead of hard law, to the issue area are satisfied.
D.

Argument

The foregoing arguments based in both international legal theory and international relations theory support the following
conclusions:
(1) that the jus ad bellum constitutes an overstretching of the
normative and structural capacities of the formal sources of
international law in their current evolutionary status; and
(2) that as a consequence of (a) this overstretching, (b) the
resulting gap between law and reality in the area of counterproliferation-oriented preemption, and (c) the harm caused by
94.

See generally Dinah Shelton, Introduction to Chapter 8: Multilateral Arms Control, in

COMMITMENT &

COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NoRMs

IN THE INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL SYSTEM 465-66 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2000; Barry Kellman, Protection of Nuclear
Materials, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NoN-BINDING NORMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 486-505 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2002) (discussing the use of soft
law to combat the spread of WMDs).
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this gap not only to the perceived legitimacy of use of force law
but to the perceived legitimacy of the rest of the formal corpus
of international law, the body of formal international law now
constituting international use of force law should be normatively
re-characterized as comprising non-binding commitments, or
soft law.
Before proceeding with a further explanation of these conclusions, it is important to distinguish this deformalization thesis from
other more extreme arguments relating to the prudential character of international norms in this area, and particularly those of
Michael Glennon, which might be termed the "legal nihilist"
95
approach to use of force law.
Glennon's exhaustive writing on the subject of the character and
usefulness of international law, particularly in the area of use of
force law can be summarized as follows. Glennon argues that the
rules of the U.N. Charter regulating international uses of force are
hopelessly unrealistic and impractical, and that because of this
impracticality a gap between the law and state practice has been
maintained since the Charter was established. He argues that
because of this gap, policymakers do not consider international use
of force rules as constituting binding law, and therefore tend to
ignore them in their policy decisions. As a result of this consistent
disregard and breach, he argues, international use of force law has
fallen into desuetude, or has become invalid as law. Therefore, he
argues, it should continue to be disregarded by policymakers.
Glennon is satisfied (and indeed appears pleased) that there are
effectively no international norms which should influence state
behavior in their international uses of force. He offers no replacement norms for those he says have fallen into invalidity through
non-compliance, simply leaving it to states to decide for themselves
which standards if any should guide their behavior in this area of
interaction, without any principled framework around which international pressure can be mounted to convince the forceful state
that the conduct, while perhaps politically expedient, runs afoul of
long standing principles to which the state itself has assented. The
only hope he offers for standards to guide states in this area in the
future is the potential evolution of customary law through state
practice.
95. For examples of Glennon's theories, see generally supra note 33, at 540 ("1 have
suggested ... international 'rules' concerning use of force are no longer regarded as obligatory by states." (footnote and citation omitted)); Michael Glennon, How International
Rules Die, 93 GEO. LJ. 939 (2005); Michael Glennon, The Rise and Fall of the U.N. Charter's
Use of Force Rules, 27 HAsrINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 497, 509 (2004).
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While sharing some of the same observations regarding the gap
between law and reality in international use of force law, the arguments for deformalization in this Article are quite different than
Glennon's normative nihilism. The argument herein is that use of
force law should largely retain the substance, or definition of its
standards, but should simply be re-characterized by states, through
positive acts of renunciation and redrafting of documents, primarily including the U.N. Charter, and revised processes of declaration of assent to those agreements as comprising non-binding
commitments rather than binding law. These actions, along with
further state practice and opiniojurispursuant to the revised understanding of the character of use of force principles, would in time
further work a modification of relevant customary law. Some
would surely call this distinction specious, and would maintain that
in the absence of Hart's secondary administrative rules and a vertical orderer, international law has never been anything but a collection of non-binding, hortatory recommendations. 96
However, it is argued herein that this distinction is meaningful
and that the revised non-binding form of these rules would retain
to this important area of international interaction a normative core
of mutually agreed standards among states, through explicit agreement in documentary form, which would provide a principled
locus around which efforts of domestic and international compliance pressure could be focused, and that this retention of explicit
standards is both normatively and practically superior to the devilishly indeterminate processes of custom for purposes of influenc97
ing state behavior.
While maintaining this normative core of referenceable standards, however, such deformalized commitments would have the
added advantage of avoiding the unnecessary complications, tortured legal and practical fictions, and increasing harm to the per96. See Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of InternationalLaw, supra note 38, at 187071 (questioning the efficacy of international law to regulate high stakes issues).
97. SeeJeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply?: Social Learningand European Identity Change, 55
INT'L ORG. (Summer) 553, 557-58 (2001). This conclusion has some theoretical kinship to
the arguments of the managerial school of regime theory, in which compliance with
regime norms is asserted to be more likely achieved through persuasive and "managerial"
approaches rather than by the use of coercive sanctions built into the structure of regimes.
See CHASES & CHAVES, supra note 81. It is also in keeping with the definition of international regimes put forward by Stephen D. Krasner as "sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge
in a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, StructuralCauses and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2 (Stephen Krasner,

ed., 1983).
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ceived legitimacy of international law which will necessarily
accompany the continued application of formal, binding rules to
this international issue area.
With regard to the substance of such deformalized rules, as
argued above in the first instance the definition of such standards
need not depart from their construction in existing legal documents, including most importantly the U.N. Charter. However, as
Abbott and Snidal point out, one of the many utilities of soft law
regulation is the facility of such norms for amendment with far
lower transactions costs than those incurred in efforts to amend
formal, binding agreements. 9 8 The recognition of an agreement as
non-binding allows states to renegotiate the language of standards
in a much less pressured environment, both due to the fact that
they know their actions may never be as strictly decried as illegitimate based upon such non-binding standards, as well as the fact
that the domestic procedures and scrutiny which accompany the
initial establishment as well as subsequent amendment to soft law
agreements are often not nearly as onerous as those which accompany the establishment or amendment of hard law agreements.
Thus, it is likely that such soft law standards could be drafted, or
subsequently amended, to incorporate an increased measure of
specificity in the definition or explication of standards on issues
which in their hard law incarnation have eluded further explication due to significant disagreement among states. Examples of
normative regimes in which specificity has been achieved precisely
due to the non-binding nature of commitments include the multilateral export control regimes as normative addenda to binding
non-proliferation treaties, as well as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 99
In the use of force context, issues which might receive such
added specificity, or explication in a soft law instrument include
both anticipatory self-defense and humanitarian intervention. It is
worth briefly noting in this context that the controversies which
have long subsisted regarding the current restrictive state of international law on the subject of humanitarian interventions, and the
gap between law and reality which has appeared in this area (as

Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in InternationalGovernance,
(Summer) 421, 434-36 (2000).
99. See Daniel H. Joyner, Restructuring the MultilateralExport Control Regime System, 9 J.
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 181, 198 (2004).
98.

54
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particularly manifest in the 1999 Kosovo intervention) serve only to
support the deformalization thesis for the jus ad bellum. 0 0
It is likely that such increased specificity would not take the form
of more clearly defined or determinate standards, since the disagreements which prevented such clarity in hard law form will persist. Rather, this specificity is more likely to take the form of
agreed considerations which should guide state decisionmaking in
such areas. These considerations could include both standards
which have evolved in custom, such as necessity and proportionality, as well as other factors such as evidentiary standards and legitimating purposes which may be agreed in principle, though left in
their specific application to state discretion.10 1 This non-binding
commitment form would thus provide a normative environment in
which the sovereignty sensitive, technologically and politically
dynamic issue area of international uses of force could be more
dynamically responded to with more specific, explicitly and objectively agreed normative content than is currently possible through
hard law forms of regulation.
A further insight from the Abbott and Snidal analysis also bears
mention. That is that soft law, in many instances, because of its
relative malleability, can function as a very useful precursor to
harder forms of regulation, by allowing states to experiment with
the definition of standards in a less normatively and politically
threatening environment than that of binding multilateral treaties. 10 2 If the standards embodied in such soft law agreements
eventually successfully narrowed the gap between international
rules and state practice, the reverse process of formalization of
those norms would be relatively straightforward. The deformalization thesis, therefore, while at first blush appearing to work a retrogression in norms addressing uses of force, would be better
characterized as a tactical normative retreat, the direction of which
could easily be reversed in future.
Thus, while Glennon argues for an absence of normative standards in the area of international uses of force, the argument
herein is for a retention of the same or better international stan100. See Bartram S. Brown, HumanitarianIntervention at a Crossroads,41 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1683, 1706 (2000); Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention:Legal Analysis and a More
Persuasive Paradigm, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 597 (2002).
101. See DOYLE, supra note 54, at 46-64 (proposing standards that look to lethality and
likelihood of threat and legitimacy and legality of response); Henry Shue, What Would a
Justified Preventive Military Attack Look Like? in PREEMPTION: MILITARY ACTION AND MORAL
JUSTIFICATION (Henry Shue & David Rodin eds., 2007).
102. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 90, at 444-45.
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dards, simply with a different normative character. The rejoinder
to this deformalization thesis from many international lawyers however will be to argue that the formal, legally binding character of
norms governing uses of force is important, and that this argued
dilution of the character of norms addressing uses of force would
work a significant decrease in the influence of those norms upon
state behavior for a number of reasons, and thus to their value in
preserving international peace and order. Concern would be no
doubt expressed that this path would lead inexorably to a
returning of the international normative environment to the bellum
omnium contra omnes status of pre-jus ad bellum international relations, resulting from each state having a largely unregulated competence du guerre. It is to these objections to the deformalization thesis
that consideration will now turn.
IV.

Is SOFr

LAW MEANINGFUL?

The idea that soft law, or non-binding international norms matter (i.e. influence state action) is in fact much easier to argue than
the idea of hard law or formally binding norms having any greater
marginal effect on state behavior than soft law norms have. The
former argument is supported by extensive and well-developed
literature in the field of international relations theory, and in the
sub-field of liberal institutionalism particularly. 10 3 As Robert Keohane, et al. have written:
103.

See, e.g., ROBERT JERVIS, Security Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, 173,

173

(Steven Krasner, ed., 1983); ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY. COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 63-105 (1984); COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY

(Kenneth Oye ed., 1986); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Robert Keohane and Lisa
Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT'L SEC. 1, 39, 50; ; Oran Young, Political
Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in InternationalSociety, 45
INT'L ORG. 281, 284 (1991). Among international lawyers, opinions regarding the recognition of the utility of non-binding norms, as well as the term "soft law" have been mixed.
However, it is generally accepted that non-binding norms do have an impact on state
behavior, and are thus important to consider from a legal perspective. As Oscar Schachter
has noted, "[s]tates entering into a non-legal commitment generally view it as a political
(or moral) obligation and intend to carry it out in good faith. Other parties and other
states concerned have reason to expect such compliance and to rely on it.... [P]olitical
texts which express commitments and positions of one kind or another are governed by
the general principle of good faith." OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 100 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991); see also Oscar Schachter, The Twilight
Existence of Nonbinding InternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 299-304 (1977) (discussing the political and moral obligations imposed on parties to non-binding international agreements). When questioned about soft law instruments by the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once remarked
that the United States is not "morally or politically free to act as if they did not exist. On
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In certain respects the study of international institutions in political science has been directed to demonstrating that informal
institutions-not legalized and lacking any centralized enforcement-could still be effective. On the basis of institutionalist
theory one should expect frequent informal agreements, some
formal rules, and loopholes that provide flexibility in response
to political exigencies ....

Institutionalist theory has explained

how cooperation endures
without legalization, but it has not
04
explained legalization.'
To argue that a deformalization of international use of force law
to produce a system of non-binding commitments would result in a
loss of influence of those standards upon state behavior, and
thereby devolve the world into Hobbesian anarchy from which the
formal rules have saved it for the past sixty years, is simply an
unsupportable causal statement. To make this argument in light of
the model proposed herein, it would have to be shown that there is
something specifically about the formality of the norms in this area
that has had, or that should be expected to have, a significant marginal effect on bringing about peace and order, i.e. the absence of
war, over and above what soft law norms would have been able, or
should be expected to be able to achieve. As with many areas of
international relations, it is probably impossible empirically to do
this because of the absence of a control case, but again, what
the contrary, they are important statements of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith
of the United States as long as the circumstances that gave rise to them continue." CONG.
Treaties and other InternationalAgreements: The Role of the United States Senate
38 (1993) (quoting 73 U.S.Dep't of State Bulletin 613 (1975)). See generally Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 210-229 (2007); Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the InternationalLegal System, in COMMITMENT & COMPLIANCE: THE
ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21-42 (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in COMMITMENT &
RESEARCH SERV.,

COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NoN-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 100-

114 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). For a contrary view, see Jerzy Sztucki, Reflections on International 'Soft Law, in FESTSKRIFT TILL LARS HJERNER - STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 550-51
Uan Ramberg et al. eds., 1990) ( "Primo, the term is inadequate and misleading. There are
no two levels or "species" of law-something is law or is not law. Secundo, the concept is
counterproductive or even dangerous. On the one hand, it creates illusory expectations of
(perhaps even insistence on) compliance with what no one is obliged to comply; and on
the other hand, it exposes binding legal norms for risks of neglect, and international law as
a whole for risks of erosion, by blurring the threshold between what is legally binding and
what is not."). DJ. Harris has responded that although it may be paradoxical and confusing to call something "law" when it is not law, the concept is nonetheless useful to describe
instruments that clearly have an impact on international relations and that may later
harden into custom or become the basis of a treaty. CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 65-66 (5th ed. 1998). In the nonproliferation context in particular, see
George Bunn, The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon
States, 4 NONPROLIFERATION REv. 1 (1997).
104. Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 385, 392 (2000).
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empirical work there is in international relations literature simply
does not bear out this argument. This literature does however
bear out the argument that the existence of international norms
does have a marginal effect on state behavior over and above the
non-existence of norms. This evidence would seem to support the
conclusion that it is the weight of a norm as a recognized and supported international community standard, with the corresponding
moral, reputational, precedential, and reciprocity factors militating
for its observance, that in fact affects compliance and not the precise status of the norm in the relative hierarchy of legality imposed
by the international legal system. 10 5 As Charles Lipson has written:
[H]igh costs of self-enforcement and the dangers of opportunism are important obstacles to extralegal agreements. Indeed,
the costs may be prohibitive if they leave unsolved such basic
problems as moral hazard and time inconsistency. The same
obstacles are inherent features of interstate bargaining and must
be resolved if agreements are to be concluded and carried out.
Resolving them depends on the parties' preference orderings,
the transparency of their preferences and choices (asymmetrical
information), and the private institutional mechanisms set up to
secure their bargains. It has little to do, however, with whether
an international agreement is considered "legally binding" or
not.106

Similarly, Ian Hurd has recently explained:
"Legitimacy," as I use the term, refers to an actor's normative
belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and is
defined by the actor's perception of the institution.... Such a
perception affects behavior, because it is internalized by the
actor and comes to help define how the actor sees its interests.... In this sense, saying that a rule is accepted as legitimate

by some actor says nothing about its justice in the eyes of an
outside observer. Further, an actor's belief in the legitimacy of a
norm, and thus its following of that norm, need not correlate to
the actor being "law-abiding" or submissive to official regulations. Often, precisely the opposite is true: a normative conviction about legitimacy might lead to noncompliance with
laws
10 7
when laws are seen as conflicting with the conviction.
105. This of course presupposes a degree of transparency in the workings of institutions such that there is adequate information disclosure regarding norms around which
pressure can be brought to bear upon states in favor of is observance. See generally THOMAS
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 47-49 (Oxford University Press 1990);
Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism,
50 INT'L ORG. 325 (1996); Daniel H. Joyner, Restructuring the Multilateral Export Control
Regime System, 9J. Conflict & Sec. L. 181 (2004).
106. Lipson, supra note 58, at 507.
107. HuRD, supra note 65, at 7-8.
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Thus, in issue areas where hard law forms carry more costs than
benefits, it is quite reasonable to assume, as argued above, that it
would be highly preferable to have specific, soft commitments
rather than to have more vague, binding commitments, as the
specificity of the norm is more likely to form a principled locus
around which efforts of domestic and international compliance
pressure may be focused.1 08
The latter position placing primacy on the binding character of
norms regulating international uses of force is, however, argued
consistently by traditional international lawyers. 10 9 They argue that
the formality of the rule expresses its importance and centrality to
the system of norms, thus conveying a message to states that
breaching will incur more disapproval and more likely sanctions
from the international community than would breach of a soft law
norm. They argue that because of this flagging of importance,
states will be less likely to breach the rule. They further argue that
hard law provides a better normative locus for both international
and domestic compliance pressuring forces, enabling such movements to use the gravitas-laden rhetoric of illegality to delegitimize
breaches of international standards.
It is not denied that such assertions are at least in some cases
correct and therefore can add to the marginal influence of hard
law norms on state behavior over the influence of soft law norms.
However, these positive factors accompanying formality must be
taken together with negative factors accompanying it in order to
arrive at a true picture of the marginal advantage of formality, particularly in the issue area under consideration herein. In the international use of force area specifically, as in other areas of high
politics, the fact of bindingness in normative regulation can itself
108. See e.g.,
George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation? 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 380, 397 (1996) (discussing costs and benefits of using a
managerial approach instead of an enforcement approach to address compliance issues);
Judith Goldstein and Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics: A
CautionaryNote, 54 INT'L ORG. 603 (2000) (discussing the costs and benefits associated with
the increased legalization of international trade); Joel Trachtman, Bananas,Direct Effect and
Compliance, 10 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 655, 655 (1999) ("hard law is not necessarily good law,
and ... strengthened implementation, including possible direct effect, is not necessarily
desirable.... This seems obvious once we recognize that, putting aside for a moment
transaction costs and strategic costs, states generally have the level of compliance that they
want. The correct role for scholars and for lawyers involved with these issues is to help
political decision-makers to identify circumstances in which, due to such problems, states
have not achieved the desired level of compliance.").
109. See, e.g., Nico Krisch, InternationalLaw in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the
Shapingof the InternationalLegal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369 (2005).
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produce negative effects at least partially counteracting any benefits accruing from it.
As Charles Lipson explains, binding law is often established in
such issue areas in order to reflect long term interests back upon
state behavior and thereby give added incentive for not breaching
the rules precisely because it is known that the issue area contains
concerns of high politics and is thus highly sensitive for policymakers in the short term. 11 0 Because of this high political sensitivity in
the short term, these are of course the issue areas in which states
are most likely to breach when their short term interests appear to
them to overshadow their longer term interests. 1 ' Therefore, paradoxically, the original desire to give added incentive to comply
ends up installing a formal legal framework in an area most likely
to see those formal laws breached in times of extremity.1 2 These
original high intentions thus in actuality produce an effect deleterious to the assumptions which underlay them, as the high-profile
breaches of formal, binding agreements which they facilitate, harm
the perceived credibility of the very norms being used, and by
extension the legal system as a whole.' 13
Therefore, in some issue areas it will be conceded that bindingness may indeed give added weight of influence upon state practice, facilitating predictability and surety of commitments, and
raising the political costs of non-compliance, and can thus be a very
useful legal fiction to maintain. However, as with the horizontal
structural forces producing compliance pressuring in the international legal system, it is argued that this marginal advantage in
influence achieved from bindingness is likely to occur only meaningfully in low politics areas where-because of low costs of compliance, damage to short term interests being deemed compensated
by achievement of long term interests, and reasonable expectations
of reciprocity being maintained-the decisionmaking environment
is one wherein states are already close to compliance anyway.
In high politics areas, any marginal effect on state behavior
toward compliance derived from bindingness is likely to be minor
in degree, and, most importantly, is highly likely to be outweighed
in states' policymaking calculus, per the Lipson paradox, in the
very situations in which it would be hoped that norms would matter, i.e. when situations arise in which states perceive compliance as
110.
111.

See Lipson, supra note 58, at 512.
Id.

112. Id.
113. Id.
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being harmful to their vital national survival and prosperity
interests.a

14

We must accept that, at the current state of evolution of international law as a legal system, in high politics areas like international
uses of force, it is not the bindingness of the norm that makes for
high levels of compliance. It is rather the strength of and consensus regarding wider social and political concerns and values which
the norm expresses. Only these considerations, and active forces
of compliance pressuring brought to bear in support thereof, can
hope to truly influence state action, not considerations of the character of the norm itself. Thus in international use of force law,
non-binding norms can be expected to have just as much of an
influence on state behavior as binding ones have had, particularly
if because of their non-binding character, they can be made more
specific and thus serve more effectively as normative loci around
which international compliance pressure can be focused.
V.

PRACTICAL EFFECTS/BENEFITS

The essential practical benefits of such a deformalization of
international use of force law are that it would provide norms to
which states would positivistically and explicitly assent and that
would be acknowledged to apply to this area of international relations on the one hand, but which would allow states with legitimate
concerns, as particularly expressed in WMD counterproliferation
strategies, the flexibility they need to deal with modern threats to
their vital national security and prosperity interests on the other.
With such standards in place, states seen by the international community to act in disharmony with such agreed standards could be
made subject to precisely the same methods of compliance pressure which now serve as sanctions for breaches of binding, hard law
rules. Unilateral or multilateral sanctions could be imposed on the
basis of these standards, and if necessary, military force could be
used, as coordinated by international regimes with duly delegated
institutional discretion. The court of world opinion regarding
compliance with these standards would still be in constant session.
And again, using such soft law sources, it is as explained above reasonable to hope that standards of conduct would be given more
specificity and explication than is currently the case in hard law
114. See id.; Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of InternationalLaw, supra note 38, at
1883.
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forms, making even more effective such efforts of compliance pressuring by the international community.
However, with such regulation through soft law instruments, we
would be spared the continuous and inevitably fruitless rhetorical
battles regarding formal legality of state actions regarding international uses of force, in an institutional environment in which we
are unlikely to ever get authoritative statements or adjudications of
who is right and who is wrong. Those arguments could still be usefully maintained in other issue areas in which compliance pressures, combined with formal legality, combined with increased
willingness to submit such disputes to international judicial resolution, are more likely to make such breaches fewer in number and
of less serious effect when they do occur. The deformalization
argument herein is essentially a proposal to preserve to those areas
in which it is meaningful and likely to be useful, the added weight
of formal bindingness of rules, and to relieve issue areas in which it
is likely not to be meaningful and unlikely to be useful from its
inefficiencies. To place it in Morgenthauian terms, to save for normative regimes in those issue areas in which meaningful sanctions
are likely and are likely to compel compliance, the moniker and
trappings of valid law.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEFORMALIZATION THESIS

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Should the international community choose to implement the
deformalization proposals in this Article, what would be the implications for the U.N. Charter organizational system? As noted previously, a deformalized U.N. Charter system would essentially retain
its principled structure and content. Furthermore, the organs of
administration created by the Charter and their respective roles
could also remain largely unchanged. In fact, very little of the
activity of the United Nations as an organization is at all dependent
upon the status of the U.N. Charter as a formal treaty.
The United Nations as an organization could still serve all of its
functions as a center for multilateral diplomacy on a wide array of
issues of international concern, and could play essentially similar
roles to those it has always played in facilitating communication
among states, in coordinating negotiations on new treaties, in
advancing issues of importance to the international community
including human rights, and in issuing normative pronouncements. There could still be a General Assembly with its associated
subsidiary committees and bodies.
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The only changes to the functioning of the United Nations
which would be occasioned by the adoption and implementation
of the deformalization thesis by the international community
would have to do with the role and authority of the Security Council, and these changes would still in fact arguably change little in
practice. As the Charter would no longer be a treaty, the Security
Council would have no authority to issue legally binding decisions-in effect Article 25 would be left out of the revised Charter
document. There could indeed still be a Security Council under
the deformalized U.N. structure, which would continue to be a specialized deliberative body, with primary responsibility for issues of
international peace and security. The Council could issue decisions either approving or condemning particular state actions, and
making recommendations for the resolution of international disputes as it ever has done. It could even continue to play a meaningful role in the legitimization or delegitimization of forceful
measures up to and including international uses of force, in exercise of its Chapter VII role-though to be clear, since there would
no longer be a formal legal prohibition on international force, pursuant to the Lotus principle there would be no need to have such
uses of force formally authorized.1 1 5 Rather, the Council's role in
this regard would be that of legitimacy determination for forceful
measures up to and including uses of force. As Ian Hurd has
recently demonstrated, fulfilling this role of legitimacy determination and promulgation has been the Council's primary contribu116
tion as a part of the U.N. Charter system.
As has been argued above, the effectiveness of an international
commitment or institution has more to do with the presence of
generally supported norms than it does with the character of those
norms as legal or non-legal. Thus, if states agreed to continue the
Security Council's mandate as a legitimizer of forceful actions, and
so long as the Council demonstrated by its record that it could act
in a supportable and legitimate manner in this role, the lack of
formal legal authority underpinning its decisions should have little
bearing on the Council's ability to function in this role-as indeed
it would be difficult to demonstrate that the effectiveness of the

115. See Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7 1927) (stating that "restrictions upon the independence of States cannot... be presumed" and that
international law leaves to States "a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules").
116. HuRD, supra note 65, at 194-96.
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Council has in the past been enhanced by its possession of formal
117
legal authority per se.
It should be briefly noted that a deformalization of the U.N.
Charter would have no necessary effect upon the role and functioning of the International Court of Justice. The ICJ statute is
essentially separate from the Charter, and the ICJ could continue
to function as it ever has.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This Article has described one possible option for the future of
the jus ad bellum. Because of its revolutionary nature it will no
doubt be met with skepticism and quickly dismissed by many.
However, it is argued that at the current crisis moment, we must be
willing to take bold and creative steps in order to bring the character and organization of this important area of international normative regulation into line with what are reasonable expectations for
the capacity and usefulness of international norms in an area of
such high politics and state sovereignty sensitivity. As stressed
herein, addressing this crisis moment need not simply be a question of the maintenance or not of international norms in this issue
area, but rather a question of what kind of international norms
would be best suited for the purpose of standardizing international
behavior in this issue area to the extent realistically possible given
the current evolutionary state of the international legal system. It
has been argued that the continuing negative implications of
allowing formal international law to be overstretched to include
within its regulation issue areas that it simply cannot reasonably be
expected to regulate effectively at the current stage of its evolutionary progression, will include decreasing respect for international
law generally, and, albeit unfairly, a lessening of the perceived
authority of international law in other areas in which it does in fact
function relatively well. It is hoped that international lawyers will
have the intellectual integrity not to be bound to the status quo simply for its own sake, and that we will be willing to think and act in
117. See id. at 128 ("The Security Council is just one example of such a higher authority, revealed not by its Charter or any legal interpretation but by the practice of states
themselves."); Lipson, supra note 58, at 507; see also Trachtman, supra note 108, at 676-78
(1999) ("[T]he type of binding force desired depends, to some extent, on the substantive
obligations concerned, as well on the institutional legitimacy of the legislator that makes
the law and the tribunal applies it.... [A d]enial of direct effect and weak mechanisms of
compliance may be viewed not necessarily as gaps in compliance, but as mechanisms to
reinforce democratic legitimacy, to the extent that the state is the locus of democratic
legitimacy.").
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the best interests of the future of international law generally, to
enable it to better fulfill its important role in international
relations.

